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ABSTRACT

The importance of strategic alliances in the financial services industry is
increasing; however, research focusing on strategic alliances is limited. In this
dissertation, I intend to enhance the existing literature by examining the effect of strategic
alliances on the value of financial services firms and the level of cooperation between
partner firms involved in strategic alliances. The specific objectives of the dissertation are
to examine the market reaction to strategic alliance announcements, to examine the preand post-announcement long-run abnormal stock performance and operating performance
for the participants o f strategic alliances, and to examine joint ventures and mergers and
acquisitions after strategic alliances.
I examine a sample of strategic alliances made by financial services firms during
the years 1986 to 2003 using various data sources such as the Securities Data Corporation
(SDC) database, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Compustat, and
Lexis/Nexis. The results show that the market reacts positively to the announcements of
strategic alliances by financial services firms. The announcements of alliances increase
the value o f partner firms by 0.53%. I find no consistent evidence of abnormal stock
performance before or after announcements. The market reaction seems to fully capture
the wealth effects associated with strategic alliances. Alliance firms experience an
improvement in operating performance before

alliance announcements

and a

deterioration afterwards. The deterioration in operating performance after alliance

iii
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announcements is driven by the deterioration in industry performance. Strategic alliance
firms are more likely to form joint ventures or merge than randomly selected or matched
firms. However, joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions are not common after strategic
alliances; only about 5% of alliances are followed with joint ventures and mergers with
partner firms. Firms often form alliances without expecting this cooperation to become
more involved through joint ventures or mergers. The market reacts more favorably to
alliance announcements by firms that are subsequently acquired by the alliance partners.
The market seems to be able to predict at the time of the alliance announcement which
firms have potential for extending their cooperation. I also find that equity alliances and
alliances with prior relationships between partners are more likely to be followed by joint
ventures or mergers and acquisitions.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
To take advantage of growth opportunities, financial services firms can grow
internally, join strategic alliances, form joint ventures, or acquire other firms. When
compared with an acquisition or joint venture, a strategic alliance is the simplest form of
cooperation between firms. Due to the complex and competitive financial market,
financial services firms increasingly engage in strategic alliances for different
motivations. For example, firms can share resources without incurring substantial risks. If
a strategic alliance is successful and firms want to expand their cooperation, they can
proceed with a joint venture or merger. An advantage of such a gradual increase in
cooperation is the reduction in information asymmetry between firms before they make
substantial investments.
The popularity of strategic alliances has attracted the attention of scholars in the
management and finance disciplines who have examined different aspects of the issue
both theoretically and empirically. However, little research has focused the financial
services industry so far. This empirical study is conducted in order to investigate how
strategic alliances can affect the value of financial services firms and the cooperation
between partner firms after strategic alliances.

1
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This study also has important practical implications for practitioners such as
managers of financial services firms and shareholders of these firms. This study intends
to provide insights into alliance activities that might help managers participate more
effectively in alliances, from the initial formation to the final outcome. It might also help
the shareholders of these firms to have a better idea as to the kinds of alliance activities
that firms are engaging in and how these activities might affect their investment.
Therefore, in this dissertation, I examine the effect of strategic alliances on the
value of financial services firms and the level of cooperation between partner firms after
alliance formation. Chapter 1 of this study is organized as follows. Section 1.1 explains
the importance of the use and the evolution of strategic alliances by financial services
firms. Section 1.2 presents the purpose and specific objectives of the study. Section 1.3
summarizes the contributions o f the study. Section 1.4 presents the plan o f the study.

1.1 The Importance of the Use and the Evolution of Strategic
Alliances by Financial Services Firms
Besides internal expansion and mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances have
become important means for financial services firms to accelerate growth over the past
20 years. In the 1980s, there were only a few strategic alliances involving financial
services firms. Since 1990, however, the number of alliances has increased dramatically.
According to the “Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector,” about 1,640 strategic
alliances and joint ventures involving financial services firms were formed during 19901999 in North America alone, and about half of them were formed during the 2-year
period of 1998 through 1999 (Group of Ten, 2001). The substantial increase in the use of
strategic alliances by financial services firms was due to the fact that financial markets
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became more complex and diversified. Three main factors contributed to this
extraordinary change: deregulation in the industry (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003),
technology advance, and globalization (Gup & Marino, 2003).
Deregulation in the financial services industry has gone through a long process.
The historical reason behind regulation dated back to the stock market crash in 1929.
Following the crash, the 1933 Banking Act (the Glass-Steagall Act) was passed to make
banks safer. Specifically, the Act prohibited banks from offering commercial banking,
investment banking, and insurance services altogether. The Act reduced the risk of
speculation when these activities were conducted in one organization (Cornett, Ors, &
Tehranian, 2002).
In 1956, the Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act was passed in order to prohibit
banks from gaining too much power by forming bank holding companies. BHCs could
not engage in most non-banking activities or acquire voting securities of non-banks
(Bank Holding Company Act o f 1956. Retrieved April 27,2007, from
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/6000-100.html).
After 1963, banks started to challenge those regulations by underwriting securities
such as commercial paper. In most cases, the courts eventually permitted these activities.
Thus, in 1987, commercial BHCs were finally allowed to establish separate so-called
Section 20 subsidiaries as investment banks. Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act (1933)
forbade banks from engaging in investment services. In 1997, commercial banks were
further able to acquire investment banks as Section 20 subsidiaries in addition to
establishing subsidiaries on their own (Cornett, Ors, & Tehranian, 2002).

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

4

The deregulation process continued with the establishment of the Financial
Services Modernization Act (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) in 1999. This Act essentially
ended most depression-era regulation by repealing the Glass-Steagall Act and amending
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 by allowing for the creation of financial holding
companies. As a result o f these changes in regulation, financial holding companies were
allowed to own banks as subsidiaries and other subsidiaries involved in various kinds of
financial services such as investment and insurance services (Cornett, Ors, & Tehranian,
2002).
Deregulation in the financial services industry induced competition, which
sparked a substantial number o f strategic alliances. Thus, more alliances arose within the
financial services industry itself between different financial services providers, such as
banks and investment services firms (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003)
New technologies are also dramatically changing the financial services industry.
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) allow customers to access their bank accounts,
check account balances, and make withdrawals and deposits without a bank teller.
Electronic payment systems manage payments and receipts of payments electronically.
Online banking (or internet banking) allows customers to perform transactions and
payments over the internet through banks’ secure websites. All these services were
developed in order to provide more comprehensive and convenient services to the
customers. As the competition in the industry becomes more intense, banks lacking
technological expertise are searching for necessary partners. Thus, technological changes
induce more cross-industry alliances between financial services firms and technology
firms (Gup & Marino, 2003).

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

5

Modem communication and transportation systems and a political/legal
environment intent on encouraging international trade and finance set the stage for
globalization. With the extensive development of worldwide relationships between
countries, in order to maintain competitive advantage, financial services firms can no
longer focus only on the domestic market. With international growth, it becomes more
and more important for financial services firms to expand their customer bases and keep
their market shares. When financial services firms lack financial capital, human capital,
experience, or expertise to go abroad through internal expansion or mergers and
acquisitions, strategic alliances provide a means to overcome these problems. These
firms gain further benefits by acquiring new knowledge, new customers, and new
distribution systems as well as accessing hard-to-get-in markets and experiencing lower
production costs. Thus, globalization induces more international alliances in the financial
services industry (Gup & Marino, 2003).
With this increasingly complex and diversified financial market, international
alliances, technology alliances, and short-term alliances targeting unique but important
opportunities are likely to become more common (Spekman, Isabelle, & MacAvoy, 2000).
Despite the recent popularity o f strategic alliances in the financial services
industry, limited research has been done to examine them. Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins
(2003) and Chiou and White (2005) conducted two of the few pioneer studies. It is a
timely opportunity for this study to enhance the existing literature by providing a more
comprehensive and detailed investigation of the issue. It is important for this study to
provide insight into alliance activities that might help firms to participate more
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effectively in alliances, from the initial formation to the final outcome, as well as help
shareholders of these firms to have a better understanding of alliance activities and how
these activities affect their investment.

1.2 Purpose and Specific Objectives of the Study
In this dissertation, I intend to enhance the existing literature regarding strategic
alliances. My main purpose of the study is to examine the effect of strategic alliances on
the value of financial services firms and the level of cooperation between partner firms
after strategic alliance formation. The specific objectives of the dissertation are as follows:
1. To examine the market reaction to strategic alliance announcements on average
and to investigate the difference in market reactions for alliances with different
characteristics.
2. To examine the long-run abnormal stock performance for the participants of
strategic alliances before and after the alliance announcements and to compare it to that
of industry peers.
3. To examine the operating performance for the participants of strategic alliances
before and after the alliance announcements and to compare it to that of industry peers.
4. To examine the likelihood of joint ventures being formed after strategic
alliances and to compare it to that of other randomly selected or matched firms.
5. To examine the likelihood of mergers and acquisitions after strategic alliances
and to compare it to that of other randomly selected or matched firms.
6. To examine the market reaction to alliance announcements for alliances
followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions.
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1.3

Contributions of the Study

The study provides two main contributions to the existing literature by examining
the effect o f strategic alliances on the value of financial services firms and the level of
cooperation between partner firms after strategic alliances.
First, the study enhances the strategic alliance literature by providing a
comprehensive analysis of alliances. Previous studies of strategic alliances focus on the
market reaction to the announcement using the event-study methodology. Some of them
further investigate the post-announcement stock performance or pre- and post
announcement operating performance. In this study, I conduct a more comprehensive
analysis, examining not only the market reaction to the announcement, pre- and post
announcement stock performance of the partner firms, and pre- and post-announcement
operating performance of the partner firms, but also the level of cooperation between
strategic alliance partners after strategic alliance announcements. I examine the
likelihood of joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions after strategic alliances and
compare it to that o f other randomly selected or matched firms. I further examine the
market reaction to alliance announcements for alliances followed by joint ventures or
mergers and acquisitions.
Second, the dissertation contributes to the study of the financial services industry
by focusing only on strategic alliances and by extending the sample period. Due to
deregulation in the industry, technology advancements, and globalization that make the
financial markets more complex and diversified, there has been a substantial increase in
strategic alliances by financial services firms in the past 20 years. However, limited
research has been conducted to examine strategic alliances in the financial services
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industry. Even though quite a few studies have been conducted to investigate different
aspects o f alliance activities through the years, with a wide range of industries included in
the samples, the results of those papers are not directly applicable to alliances in the
financial services industry. Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) and Chiou and White
(2005) are two of the few pioneer studies that focus on strategic alliances made by
financial services firms. Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) examine a sample of joint
ventures and strategic alliances of financial services firms during the period of 1985 to
1998. Chiou and White (2005) examine a strategic alliance sample of Japanese financial
institutions for the period of 1997-1999. Although similar to these two studies, my study
focuses only on strategic alliances formed by U.S listed financial services firms.
Differently from Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003), I exclude joint ventures
from my strategic alliance sample. Strategic alliances are less complex than joint ventures,
as they do not involve the creation of a new entity; thus, joint ventures have an essentially
different ownership structure for control of assets and more defined property rights (Das,
Sen, & Sengupta, 1998). Studies also show that strategic alliances and joint ventures tend
to be created under different circumstances and involve different outcomes. Chan,
Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) show that strategic alliance firms tend to exhibit
better operating performance than same-industry firms before strategic alliances, while
Mohanram and Nanda (1996) show that firms experience performance deterioration
before joint ventures. Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) find that only 5 of
their 345 sample alliances evolved into a joint venture or a merger between the partners.
In contrast, Bleeke and Ernst (1995) find that 80% of joint ventures end in a takeover by
one of the partners.
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Furthermore, the sample period (1986-2003) of my study covers an entire
business cycle and the deregulation process of the financial services industry, while
Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) end their sample period in 1998, just before the
passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) in 1999.
As a result of the changes in regulation, financial holding companies are allowed to own
banks as subsidiaries and other subsidiaries involved in all kinds of financial services
such as investment services and insurance services. These regulatory changes help create
more alliances within the financial services industry itself and thus increase the number
of alliances formed by financial services firms as a whole.
Different from Chiou and White (2005) who investigate alliances in Japan, I
examine alliances of U.S. listed firms and intend to provide a comparison of the alliance
activities in the U.S. versus those in Japan.
In summary, by finishing this dissertation, I intend to make contributions to the
existing literature o f strategic alliances and the financial services industry by providing a
longer sample period, a cleaner and more restricted sample, and a more thorough analysis.

1.4 Plan of Study
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a
literature review of the relevant studies. It includes theoretical background on strategic
alliances such as real option theory, resource dependence theory, signaling theory,
transaction-cost economics theory, and business strategy theory. This chapter also
includes relevant empirical evidence from earlier studies. Chapter 3 presents my research
design, including hypotheses, sample description, data collection, and research
methodology. Chapter 4 reports the empirical results of the analysis. Chapter 5 presents
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the conclusions and implications of this study and presents recommendations for future
research.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

As today’s financial services market becomes more and more complex, strategic
alliances become more and more popular for firms to explore new opportunities and
maintain their competitive advantage in the market. With alliances’ increasing
importance, scholars in both the finance and management disciplines are exploring
related issues and intend to provide insight into alliance activities that might help firms
participate more effectively in the alliances, from the initial formation to the final
outcome. Research studies might also help firms to prevent the resulting failures that are
common for many alliances.
The management literature has provided a great deal of insight into the
motivations for participating in strategic alliances, with strong theoretical research
including five appealing theories: business strategy theory, real option theory, resource
dependence theory, signaling theory, and transaction-cost economics theory. Case studies
of individual alliances are also analyzed in order to illustrate the pros and cons of the
alliances and the details of the allying process. Analysis of the choice between the use of
alliances and other methods of expansion such as mergers and acquisitions is also a
popular issue.

11
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In finance, instead of focusing on the theoretical justification for firms joining in
alliances as much o f the management literature does, the majority of research has been
conducted in regard to quantifying the impact on the value of the firms associated with
the alliances and further ascertaining the determinants of value creation.
The literature review of the related studies is organized as follows. I first define
the term “strategic alliances” as used in this study in order to prevent further confusion,
and then I provide a thorough theoretical background regarding the motivations of firms
participating in strategic alliances that is largely based on the management literature.
Next, I provide a detailed review of the related empirical literature regarding strategic
alliances from studies in both the finance and management areas. In order to give an
overall picture of alliance activities, I also give a brief description of the strategic-alliance
formation process as well as the drawbacks that might cause the failure of strategic
alliances. At the end o f the literature review, I present a summary on how my study is
related to the existing research.

2.1 Definition of Strategic Alliances
The definition of strategic alliances has taken various forms in the literature
through the years. In spite of some degree of variation, several elements seem to be
common and essential. First, an “inter-firm” strategic alliance is an activity or
relationship with two or more firms involved (Gilroy, 1993; Parkhe, 1993; Gulati, 1998;
M ockler, 1999). Second, in a “cooperative” strategic alliance, firms involved cannot act

independently but must work with each other (Gilroy, 1993; Parkhe, 1993; Ireland, Hitt
& Vaidyanath, 2002). Third, “common goal” firms get into a strategic alliance to achieve
a certain shared aspiration, which in turn is beneficial to the individual partner firms
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(Parkhe, 1993; Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995; Mockler, 1999). Fourth, in a “sharing
resources” strategic alliance, various resources such as capital, human resources, or
technology are pooled together from the partner firms (Parkhe, 1993; Varadarajan &
Cunningham, 1995; Gulati, 1998; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002). Fifth, a strategic
alliance is a “hybrid” network organizational form, which is somewhere between internal
expansion and acquisitions. (Borys & Jemison, 1989; Kensinger & Martin, 1991;
Lorange & Roos, 1992).
In some studies, strategic alliances refer to any type of cooperative activities,
which includes both alliances and joint ventures, while in other studies joint ventures are
not included. This inconsistency in the literature forces me to first define the term
“strategic alliance” for this study. A strategic alliance in this study is defined as a
cooperative business activity with two or more organizations that share resources,
responsibilities, risks, and rewards for achieving common goals, but no separate entity
such as a joint venture is created.
Based on certain criteria, strategic alliances can be further classified. In the
literature, different classifications are formed, depending on the needs of the studies.
Some common classification schemes are listed as follows.
The first type of classification is based on the degree of equity investment and
contractual control (Harrigan, 1985). Strategic alliances can be classified into two forms:
non-equity alliances and equity alliances (Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskinsson, 2004). Non-equity
alliances are less formal, pure contractual alliances without any equity investments
between the partner firms. Partner firms are only sharing resources and achieving
common goals but are having no contractual control. Equity alliances are alliances with
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equity investments involved in the agreements. As the degree of equity investment
increases, the alliances tend to be more formal and partners have more contractual control.
Equity alliances have increased rapidly through the years. Pekar and Margulis (2003)
document that only 25% were equity alliances in a sample of 3,000 alliances during the
period of 1997 to 1999, while during the period of 2000 to 2002, the percentage of equity
alliances jumped to 66% in a sample of 2,500 alliances.
Equity alliances can be further classified into two types: minority equity alliances
and cross-equity holding alliances (Pekar & Margulis, 2003). Minority equity alliances
are equity alliances in which minority amounts of equity investments are made in one
partner by another partner in an alliance and the investments are less than 50% of the
stock holdings. For example, in 1994, The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
(HSBC) Holdings and Banco del Sur del Peru, a unit of Luksic Group’s Invesiones
Financieras subsidiary, formed a strategic alliance; and in the agreement, HSBC agreed to
purchase a 10% stake in Banco del Sur del Peru. Cross-equity holding alliances are
alliances in which partners make equity investments in each other. For example, in 2001,
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BB) and Telefonica SA (TS) formed a strategic
alliance to provide investment services in Spain. In the agreement, TS made a 3% equity
investment in BB, and BB increased its stock holding in TS from 8% to 10%.
The second type of classification is based on the time period of the commitment
and level of investment. Short-term alliances of fewer than five years are transactional
and involve less funding; long-term alliances of more than five years increase the level of
investment; and to the extreme, in permanent alliances, the funding ranges from cross
equity holding to wholly owned subsidiaries (Harbison & Pekar, 1998).
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The third type of classification is based on alliance activities. As alliance
activities can involve hundreds of different of activities, such as financial services,
marketing services, internet services, insurance services, etc, the alliances are usually
classified into broad activity groups. One approach is illustrated in Vyas, Shelbum, and
Rogers (1995). The study examines the degree of profitability associated with firms in
mature industries and high-tech industries, and strategic alliances are classified into two
forms: market-related and technology-related alliances.
The fourth type of classification is based on the geographic regions of the alliance
partners. Domestic alliances are alliances with partner firms from one country, while
international alliances are alliances with partner firms from different countries (Gleason,
Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003).
The fifth type of classification is based on the industries of the partner firms.
Within-industry/horizontal alliances are alliances with partner firms from the same
industry, while cross-industry/diversifying alliances are alliances with partner firms from
different industries (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003).

2.2 Theoretical Background—Why Financial Services Firms
Participate in Strategic Alliances
There are five prevailing theories in the literature explaining the motivations for
forming strategic alliances. They are business strategy theory, real options theory,
resource dependence theory, signaling theory, and transaction-cost economics theory.
2.2.1 Business Strategy Theory
Based on the original framework of the five forces that determine the
attractiveness of a market (Porter, 1979), Porter (1986) states the determinants of the
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formation of strategic alliances: the threat from new-entry firms and substitute products,
the bargaining power of suppliers and buyers, and the competition among firms. Strategic
alliance firms, recognizing these forces, typically adopt one of three strategies: become
and remain the lowest cost firm in the industry, differentiate their products from others,
or focus on a narrow market niche in order to outperform their competitors.
Forming strategic alliances can be very useful to raise entry barriers in the
industry and effectively reduce potential threats from future competition. Partner firms
thus are able to maintain their competitive positions in the market (Vaidya, 1999).
Strategic alliances are often used as a strategic means for integrating or
diversifying to expand the scale and/or scope of their operations. Firms participating in
within-industry/horizontal alliances are seeking different geographic markets, expanding
their product line,

or eliminating

competition.

Firms participating in cross

industry/diversifying alliances are seeking new expertise, new geographic or product
markets (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003). Strategic alliances help firms in mature
industries to enter into new and emerging industries. Market share can be gained by
either entering a new geographic market or entering a new product market. When
accessing new markets, strategic alliances represent a less costly means of acquiring
resources without paying a high acquisition premium.
Furthermore, when firms seek global growth opportunities but lack financial
capital, experience, or expertise necessary to undertake internal expansion, strategic
alliances provide a means to overcome these problems. Alliances are also useful when
certain foreign governments prohibit international mergers. Such barriers can be removed
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by entering strategic alliances with local firms from within those countries (Gleason,
Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003).
2.2.2 Real Options Theory
An option is something offered for choice. In finance, the options are usually
referred to as financial options, which are derivative contracts, including call options and
put options. The holder of a financial option has the right but not the obligation to buy or
sell a specific amount o f a financial instrument on or before a specific date at a specific
price, and the payoff is determined by the price of the financial instrument, such as a
common stock (Kolb, 2002).
Even though businessmen have been making investment choices for centuries,
Myers (1977) incorporates the idea of options into the business investment decision.
Rather than dealing with financial instruments, Myers introduces the concept of a real
option associated with tangible assets such as equipment. For example, when making an
investment in a project, the firm has the real option of expanding, deferring, or
abandoning the project in the future. Similar to a financial option, a real option is also the
firm’s right but not the obligation to make a decision. Different from a financial option, a
real option is a non-tradable contract. Only the firm itself can decide how to deal with the
investment and cannot sell that right to others. The value of the investment can be greatly
affected by the real option, and currently the widely used methods for valuing the real
option are closed-form solutions, partial differential equations, and binomial lattices.
Based on the real options theory, Seth and Chi (2005) further associate the real
option concept with strategic alliances. They argue that making strategic alliance
decisions can be thought of as real options offered to the alliance partners. During the
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alliance process, according to the market environment and other factors, the alliance
partners have the right but not the obligation to make decisions and take actions. If the
prospects of the alliance seem to be good, the partner firms may continue cooperating and
even enhance the investment. If everything seems to be unclear, the firms may halt the
investment to conduct further investigation. If the prospects turn out to be unappealing,
the firms may terminate the alliance and withdraw their resources. The flexibility of the
alliance options creates value for the partner firms.
The flexibility of the alliance options further benefits the partner firms by
allowing quick expansion and separation without divesting problems. Jensen (1993)
argues that when a firm tries to divest its high-cost assets or excess capacity due to a
change in the market environment, contracting problems such as negotiating contracts
with unions, suppliers, or other stakeholders make it difficult for the firm to divest the
resources at the optimal time. Furthermore, during the divestment process, the managers
o f integrated corporations or joint ventures are often unwilling to release the on-hand
resources and downsize the firms, as they think that might hurt their managerial
performance and interrupt their careers. Thus, instead of actively engaging in a divesting
process, managers often try to hold the resources that should be divested as long as they
can, which creates agency costs associated with divergent management-shareholder
interests (Jensen, 1986a, b). However, when forming an alliance, the firms pool their
resources; and when the alliance is terminated, the resources do not have to be divested
and are still controlled by the managers of the partner firms. In this case, strategic
alliances avoid divesting and associated agency costs.
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The flexibility associated with strategic alliances also benefits the partner firms by
allowing firms to try out different partners when developing new technologies or new
marketing plans. Thus, rapid-growth firms and high-technology firms that are seeking
partners would benefit more from this flexibility of alliances (Mody, 1993).
2.2.3 Resource Dependence Theory
In today’s business world, firms often cannot secure and/or retain all the resources
they need, and therefore must interact with others. These resources can be materials,
human capital, financial capital, knowledge, skills, expertise, technologies, experience,
etc. However, to a certain extent, when firms recognize that they have to depend heavily
on other organizations for some resources, they need to minimize that dependency as
much as possible. There are three main issues that need to be considered when this
situation happens: what the costs to the firms would be if they keep depending on others,
what the costs to the firms would be if they abandon using those resources, and what the
firms should do if conflicts arise between them and the firms that provide the dependent
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
In order to minimize resource dependency, firms usually adopt one of two
strategies: buffering or bridging (Scott, 2002). Using the buffering approach, firms try to
increase their tolerance for the loss of those external resources for a limited period of
time. Using the bridging approach, firms try to enhance their relationships with the
external firms that are providing the dependent resources in order to avoid their loss.
Entering strategic alliances is one of the bridging strategies. By allying with
others, firms extend their resource bases instead of relying solely on others. The partner
firms may also exchange and gain knowledge and ability in the process, lower their costs,
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and achieve economies of scale in production, and the resources pooled are used more
efficiently (Lorange & Roos, 1992).
2.2.4 Signaling Theory
By entering strategic alliances with other participants in the market, firms provide
signals of the quality of their resources (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). If firms have
low-quality resources, maintaining strategic alliances with other firms would be costly
(Spence, 1974). The signal benefit is especially greater for young and small firms in
comparison to mature and large firms (Gulati & Higgins, 2003). For start-up and small
firms, less information is available in the market; thus, keeping strategic alliances serves
as a good signal of the quality of the firms.
2.2.5 Transaction-Cost Economics Theory
When buying a product, price is not the only cost; other costs such as
information-collecting costs and bargaining costs are also included. Those costs besides
price are called transaction costs.
When firms are conducting transactions to acquire assets, different organizational
structures are chosen in order to minimize the transaction costs. The specificity level of
the asset is an important determinant for choosing the structure (Williamson, 1975).
When the specificity level of the asset is relatively low, the transaction can be conducted
in an external market. When the specificity level of the asset is relatively high, the
transaction is internalized within the organization. In between, hybrid organizational
structures such as strategic alliances or joint ventures can be formed. Thus, firms choose
the organizational structure with greater control of the asset when the specificity level of
the asset increases.
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Strategic alliances may achieve optimal decision making with lower costs. In
order to achieve optimal decision making, there are two prerequisites: the person who
makes the decision possesses the knowledge, and the decision is associated with rewards
and penalties. Either delegating or transferring the knowledge can be done when the
authority does not possess the knowledge; however, both of these methods for transaction
are costly (Jensen & Meckling, 1992). Entering a strategic alliance is less costly than
acquiring a firm and both firms benefit from the transaction; thus, the partner firms
possess the knowledge to make decisions, and they share the benefits and costs associated
with the decisions they make. This is especially beneficial when high transfer costs occur
in a transaction involving research and development.
2.2.6 Other Motivations for Forming Strategic Alliances
By entering strategic alliances, firms experience different levels of risk reduction
and sharing. Regardless o f whether firms engage in domestic or international expansions,
entering strategic alliances helps them to reduce and share the production risks and
financial risks (currency and exchange-rate risks) (Kvint, 1998). The risk of poor decision
making by a single firm is reduced, as partner firms in alliances tend to have more
objective opinions regarding the partnership; and with better decisions, the risk of failure
for such an investment may further be reduced (Baum & Oliver, 1991). The risk of
uncertainty associated with the changing markets is reduced when firms acquire
knowledge and information from partners (Kogut, 1988), and possible competitive risks
associated with new-entry firms may be reduced in the future (Balakrishnan & Koza,
1993; Chi & McGuire, 1996).
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Forming strategic alliances between the acquirers and targets prior to mergers and
acquisitions reduces information asymmetries through learning and solves adverse
selection problems. Mergers and acquisitions are important means for firms to expand
and pursue growth opportunities. However, when the information needed for the
transaction is not distributed evenly between the participants of the transaction, an
adverse selection problem occurs: a “bad” target is more likely to be chosen. By entering
an alliance, the target and acquirer pool their resources first and enter the tryout phase in
order to obtain knowledge about each other before final negotiation for transferring
resources. Through this learning process, information is redistributed between the
partners, and information asymmetry is reduced. The acquirer especially discovers targetspecific information, noticing target’s strengths, weaknesses, and corporate culture (Kale,
Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000), which helps the acquirer to decide whether the target is the
right one to choose. Thus, forming suitable alliances serves as due diligence to solve the
adverse selection problem for the acquisition (Arend, 2004a). When the risk of adverse
selection is significant in a market, the reduction of information asymmetry is enhanced
by the alliance (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993).
2.2.7 Summary
As described above, different theories have provided different explanations for
why financial services firms might choose to participate in strategic alliances. The
different theories are not mutually exclusive but rather focus on different aspects of the
motivations for forming strategic alliances. Business strategy theory suggests that
forming alliances can help avoid entry barriers and provide market extension. Real
options theory suggests that forming alliances can provide organizational flexibility.
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Resource dependence theory suggests that forming alliances can provide resource
extension and reduce dependency. Signaling theory suggests that keeping alliances can
provide a signal of the quality of the firm. Transaction-cost economics theory suggests
that forming alliances can minimize transaction costs and achieve optimal decision
making. Other motivations for entering strategic alliances include risk reduction and
sharing as well as information asymmetries reduction prior to mergers and acquisitions.

2.3 Related Empirical Literature of Strategic Alliances
With the increasing importance and popularity of strategic alliances over the past
20 years, the scholars in both the finance and the management disciplines have been
empirically examining different aspects of strategic alliances based on the fundamental
theories.
One big stream of studies on strategic alliances examines the market reaction to
the alliance announcements and the impact on the value of the firms associated with the
alliances. Most of the studies first obtain the associated values using event-study
methodology and then determine the differences in the value created based on the
alliance firms’ characteristics (firm size, firm age) and the type of alliance (equity, non
equity, international, domestic) in which the firms are engaged.
Another group of studies investigates the relationships between strategic alliances
and mergers and acquisitions. The main topics involve examining the choice between
alliances and mergers and acquisitions b y the firms and discovering the impact o f

strategic alliances on mergers and acquisitions when the target and the acquirer were
strategic alliance partners.
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The third group o f studies focuses only on equity alliances instead of the whole
population of strategic alliances. The most popular issue in this group of studies is to
examine the incentives of equity investment in the strategic alliances.
There are many other topics and issues that have been studied through the years,
such as the firm risk associated with alliances, the problem of opportunism in strategic
alliances, and the marginal contribution of an additional alliance being added to an
alliance portfolio.
2.3.1 Studies Regarding Strategic Alliances and Firm Values
2.3.1.1 Financial Services Industry
There are two pioneer studies that examine strategic alliances in the financial
services industry: Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) and Chiou and White (2005).
Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) examine a sample of strategic alliances and
joint ventures of financial services firms during the period of 1985 to 1998. The authors
obtain the data from Securities Data Corporation (SDC) International Joint Ventures
database. Accounting-based data are from Standard and Poor’s Research Insights, while
stock market returns data are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). They identify banking, insurance, and investment services firms as follows:
banking includes Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6021 and 6022, insurance
companies include SIC codes 6300s and 6400s, and investments services include SIC
codes 6200s. They further restrict the sample to strategic alliances with at least one
financial services firm with financial data available and remove the firms with multiple
announcements within the 6-, 12-, or 18-month holding period. The final sample consists
of 628 announcements with 728 participants.
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The authors conduct an event study to evaluate the market reaction to strategic
alliance and joint venture announcements. They estimate the parameters during the 100day period ending 11 days before the announcement date. The announcement period
includes days -1 to 1 relative to the announcement day and -1 and 0 relative to the
announcement day. A significance test based on Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991)
is constructed.
The authors then estimate the post-announcement 6-, 12-, and 18-month average
holding-period abnormal returns relative to the returns of industry- and size-matched
firms. To create the matched sample, for each sample firm they first find all firms with
the same 4-digit SIC code, and then from these firms they choose the one with the total
assets closest to that of the sample firm to be in the matched sample. The average
difference between the sample firm and the matched firm holding-period returns is the
average holding-period abnormal return.
They find that the announcements of strategic alliance and joint venture firms are
associated with 0.66% average cumulative abnormal returns. The abnormal returns are
positive and significant for domestic, international, horizontal, and diversifying strategic
alliances and joint ventures. Furthermore, the authors find that strategic alliance and joint
venture firms outperform matching firms after the announcements for the holding-period
return.
Chiou and White (2005) examine the strategic alliances sample of Japanese
financial institutions for the period of 1997-1999. The authors identify the sample
announcements from Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Times), Nikkei Interactive
Net, and Yomiuri Shimbun. The sample is further restricted to alliances only involved
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with financial firms and with at least one publicly traded Japanese financial firm. If there
is other news such as bond/credit-rating changes, corporate control affairs, dividends,
earnings, financing arrangements, legal affairs, loan-loss reserves, or share repurchases
being announced during the 3 days before and 1 day after the sample announcement, the
observation is dropped. The final sample consists of 109 announcements with 169
Japanese financial firms.
The authors conduct an event study to evaluate the market reaction to strategic
alliance announcements using the market model. They estimate the market model
parameters during the 200-day period ending 20 days before the announcement date. The
announcement period includes days -1 and 0 relative to the announcement day. Following
the methodology used by McConnell and Nantell (1985), the authors first form an equally
weighted portfolio o f alliance partner firms for each of the 109 alliances and then treat
each portfolio as one security for calculating the test o f significance.
The authors further use three regression models to conduct the cross-sectional
analysis. All the dependent variables are the alliance abnormal returns. The independent
variables include intra-group dummy (dummy=l if the alliance firms are within the same
keiretsu, a bank-centered business group), inter-group dummy (dummy=l if the alliance

firms are from different keiretsu ), equity tie-up dummy, insurance business dummy,
investment business dummy, asset management dummy, investment banking dummy,
multiple-business dummy, comprehensive-business dummy, etc.
They find that, on average, announcements of strategic alliances increase the
value of partner firms. When compared with mergers in which target firms usually gain
substantially at the cost of the acquiring firms, the partners of the alliances are more
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concerned with a “win-win” situation, and the value gains from the alliances are spread
more fairly among the partners. Smaller partners and inter-group alliances tend to
experience larger percentage gains than larger partners and intra-group alliances.
However, no significant difference is found in the abnormal returns between domesticforeign and domestic-domestic alliances.
2.3.1.2 Other Industries
Several studies examine the impact on the value of the firms associated with
alliances in a wide range of industries, including those by Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and
Martin (1997), Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998), and Haeussler (2004).
Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) examine the value creation of 345
non-equity strategic alliances for the partnering firms during the period of 1983 to 1992.
The main purpose is to determine the differences in the value created based on the
alliance firms’ characteristics and the type of alliance in which the firms are engaged.
The authors obtain the sample of firms from both the Lexis/Nexis database
(including the Business Wire, PR Newswire, Southwest Newswire, Reuters, and United
Press International) and the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service database (including the
Dow Jones News Wire and the Wall Street Journal). They use “strategic” and “alliance”
with different types of agreements, such as licensing, marketing, distribution, supply,
production, manufacturing, development, research, and technology in searching for
announcements and find 345 announcements of 460 partnering firms with at least one
partner’s common stock available in the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP)
daily returns files.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28

The authors first conduct an event study to evaluate the market reaction to
strategic alliance announcements using the market model described in Dodd and Warner
(1983). Chan et al. estimate the market model parameters during the 150-day period
ending 21 days before the announcement date. The announcement period includes days
-20 and +5 relative to the announcement day. Abnormal returns are averaged across firms
for each of the 26 event days, and significance tests based on a standardized test statistic
are constructed. Using a 2-day (-1, 0) average abnormal return does not alter the
conclusions. They further compare the wealth changes experienced by pairs of partner
firms in order to determine whether the wealth effect is due to value creation or wealth
transference in an alliance between partners of different sizes.
Second, the authors use regression analysis to conduct the cross-sectional analysis.
The dependent variable is the announcement-date abnormal return. The independent
variables are firm size (log of market value of equity), growth opportunities variable (the
ratio of market value to book value of assets), high- versus low-tech industry
classification variable, and the horizontal versus non-horizontal alliances industry-focus
variable.
Third, the authors use the procedure of Mikkelson and Partch (1994) to examine
both the level of the firm’s operating performance and its changes during the period of
two years before and two years after the announcement of the strategic alliance. The
value of return on common equity, operating return on assets, and undistributed cash
flow return on assets are compared with each firm’s median industry performance.
Wilcoxon rank sum tests are used to determine the statistical significance.
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The authors show that the market reacts positively to strategic alliance
announcements, especially announcements by high-tech firms, with no evidence of
wealth transfer. Furthermore, they find that strategic alliance firms experience better
operating performance two years before and after alliances than industry peers.
Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998) examine the impact on the value of the firms
associated with the strategic alliance announcements. They argue that the determinants of
the associated value are the nature of the strategic alliance, the characteristics of the
partners, and the relative resource dependency between the partners.
The authors use the alliance announcements from the Wall Street Journal and the
Financial Times. They obtain the sample data of the announcements from Information
Technology Strategic Alliances (ITSA User’s Manual, 1992) during 1987-1991.

Furthermore, they restrict the sample by excluding joint ventures and multiparty alliances
and by dropping alliance announcements with either an earnings or a dividend
announcement reported five days before or after the announcement.
The authors conduct an event study to evaluate the market reaction to strategic
alliance announcements using the market model. They estimate the market model
parameters during the 190-day period ending 10 days before the announcement date. The
announcement period includes days -3 to +3 relative to the announcement day. Abnormal
returns are averaged across firms for each of the 7 event days, and significance tests
based on a standardized test statistic are constructed.
By examining a sample of 119 strategic alliances during 1987-1991 using an
event-study approach, the authors find that technological alliances yield greater abnormal
returns than marketing alliances. Furthermore, firm profitability and size are negatively
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correlated with the abnormal returns. Thus, the authors conclude that the most beneficial
partners in an alliance are smaller partners in technological alliances. On the other hand,
marketing alliances are still able to create benefits for smaller or less profitable firms that
form alliances with larger or more profitable partners.
Haeussler (2004) examines the market reaction to strategic alliances by German
firms during the period of 1997-2002 and analyzes the potential determinants of the
abnormal returns. The sample consists of 1,037 ad hoc strategic alliance announcements
in Germany during the sample period. Stock prices of announcing firms are obtained
from Thompson Financial Datastream.
Using the event-study approach, the author calculates abnormal returns following
the procedure shown in Brown and Warner (1985) and Watts (1973). Multivariate
analysis is conducted to address the determinants of the resulting abnormal returns such
as size, age of the partner firm, and alliance characteristics.
The author concludes that the German stock market reacts positively to the
announcements o f strategic alliances and negatively to the terminations of strategic
alliances. The market reaction is more favorable for high-technology firms, old firms,
smaller firms, and firms not making equity investments in partner firms.
2.3.1.3 Summary
These five papers have all provided detailed performance insights into alliance
activities using a similar event-study methodology, but samples with different
characteristics. Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) and Chiou and White (2005) focus
on the financial services industry, while Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997),
Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998), and Haeussler (2004) examine a wide range of industries.
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Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997), Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998), and
Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) use U.S. market data; while Haeussler (2004) uses
data from Germany, and Chiou and White (2005) use data from Japan. Gleason, Mathur,
and Wiggins (2003) include alliances and joint ventures in their sample; Das, Sen, and
Sengupta (1998), Haeussler (2004), and Chiou and White (2005) include only strategic
alliances; while Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) focus on non-equity
alliances. The time period of the samples ranges from 1983 to 2002, while the sample
size ranges from 109 to 1,037 alliances. All of the studies except Gleason, Mathur, and
Wiggins (2003) use multiple regression analysis with abnormal returns as the dependent
variable to identify the determinants of the abnormal returns.
The main findings are consistent across the studies. All the event studies show
that the announcements of strategic alliances are associated with positive average
cumulative abnormal returns, which means that the market reacts positively to strategic
alliance announcements, and the value of the partner firms therefore increases.
Although the main focus is on the general announcement effect of the alliances on
the partner firms, these studies have provided additional detailed findings. The market
reacts negatively to the terminations of strategic alliances (Haeussler, 2004). The
abnormal returns are positive and significant for domestic, international, horizontal, and
diversifying strategic alliances (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003). The market reaction
is more favorable for smaller firms (Chiou & White, 2005; Das, Sen, & Sengupta, 1998;
Haeussler, 2004), high-technology firms (Chan, Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997; Das,
Sen, & Sengupta, 1998; Haeussler, 2004), old firms (Haeussler, 2004), less profitable
firms (Das, Sen, & Sengupta, 1998), and firms not making an equity investment in
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partner firms (Haeussler, 2004). Strategic alliance firms outperform matching firms after
the announcements for the market return (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003) and
strategic alliance firms experience better operating performance two years before and
after alliances than industry peers (Chan, Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997). As for
differences between the inter- and intra-group alliances, Chiou and White (2005) find that
inter-group alliances tend to experience larger percentage gains than intra-group alliance
announcements.
2.3.2 Studies Regarding Strategic Alliances and Mergers and Acquisitions
Some extant literature investigates the relationships between strategic alliances
and mergers and acquisitions, including Hagedoom and Sadowski (1999), Hagedoom and
Duysters (2002), Porrini (2004), Jandik and Kali (2006), and Reuer and Ragozzino
(2006).
Hagedoom and Sadowski (1999) examine a sample of 6,425 strategic technology
alliances during the period 1970-1993 to explore the determinants of the transition from
strategic technology alliances to mergers and acquisitions. Using the data from the
MERIT-CATI data bank for alliances and the Securities Data dataset for mergers and
acquisitions; the authors estimate a Poisson regression model to test their hypotheses. As
they find only 2.6% o f the strategic technology alliances in the sample leading towards
final mergers and acquisitions, they conclude that instead of a transition strategy, the
strategic technology alliances stand alone and provide partners with opportunities to leam
new technologies and gain flexibility.
Hagedoom and Duysters (2002) examine a sample of 153 U.S., Canadian, and
European Fortune 500 companies that had formed a minimum of five strategic
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technology alliances and/or merger and acquisitions during the period of 1993-1994
using multinomial logit analysis. They find that companies that are primarily active in
high-tech sectors prefer strategic technology alliances rather than mergers and
acquisitions; in contrast, companies that favor mergers and acquisitions over alliances are
mostly found in the low-tech sectors, and companies that are primarily active in mediumtech sectors have a mixed strategy preference over mergers and acquisitions, but not vice
versa. Furthermore, the preference for mergers and acquisitions decreases with the size of
the firms; in other words, smaller firms prefer alliances rather than mergers and
acquisitions.
Porrini (2004) exams a sample of 437 acquisitions in the manufacturing sector
completed during the period 1988-1997 and investigates whether the alliance experience
between the target and acquirer affects acquisition performance. The author conducts
robust regressions with change in return on assets as the dependent variable, previous
alliance experience between the target and acquirer as the independent variable, and other
control variables. The author concludes that the previous alliances between the targets
and acquirers positively correlated with acquisition performance, which implies that such
alliances provide acquirers an opportunity to acquire target-specific information which
benefits acquisition performance.
Jandik and Kali (2006) examine a sample of international strategic alliances,
international joint ventures, and cross-border mergers (with U.S. bidders) announced
between 1985 and 2000. Using multivariate probit analysis and announcement abnormal
returns analysis, they found that when legal systems improve and information asymmetry
is reduced, arms-length arrangements such as strategic alliances and joint ventures
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replace relational arrangements. If legal/political environments continue to improve,
eventually arms-length deals will take the place of internal firm contracting.
Reuer and Ragozzino (2006) examine a sample of mergers and acquisitions
during the period of 1992-2002. The study investigates whether strategic alliances and
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) could potentially lessen the risk of adverse selection in the
acquisitions of new ventures. These researchers use binary, logistic regressions with a
maximum likelihood estimator and 2-limit Tobit models. The authors find that inter-firm
alliances between acquirers and targets reduce information asymmetries prior to mergers
and acquisitions. Furthermore, prior alliances between acquirers and targets or the
targets’ EPOs reduce the likelihood of using stock, or the amount of stock used, to finance
acquisitions of these targets afterwards.
In summary, the main findings regarding strategic alliances and mergers and
acquisitions are that corporate alliances are not necessarily a transition strategy leading to
mergers and acquisitions; small firms and companies primarily in high-tech sectors prefer
strategic technology alliances rather than mergers and acquisitions; the alliance
experience between the target and acquirer benefits acquisition performance; strategic
alliances replace relational arrangements and further edge out internal firm contracting
when legal systems improve and information asymmetry is reduced; and alliances
between acquirers and targets reduce information asymmetries prior to mergers and
acquisitions.
2.3.3 Equity Alliances Studies
Several studies examine the incentives of equity investment in strategic alliances,
including Pekar and Margulis (2003), Filson and Morales (2006), and Mathews (2006).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35

Pekar and Margulis (2003) discuss why equity alliances are taking center stage
and why major corporations are now choosing alliances over the “buy” or “build” options
to stimulate growth and increase corporate wealth. The authors discuss the different
equity alliance types and highlight characteristics, benefits, and limitations of each. They
compare alliances with acquisitions in terms of wealth creation, revenue growth, and
probability of success and present some real-world examples and insights from
executives.
Filson and Morales (2006) develop a model of monitored and staged investment
to explain why equity investment is involved in Research and Development (R&D)
strategic alliances. They argue that the use of equity serves as a monitoring tactic that
resolves uncertainty before committing more resources to the project. The authors use a
large sample o f 4,344 biotechnology alliances formed from the mid-1970s until May
2001 and use a probit model in their analysis. The empirical results support their model.
Mathews (2006) develops a model for studying the incentives of using equity in
strategic alliances. An alliance between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm
improves efficiency for both partners. However, the established firm tends to enter the
partner’s market after the knowledge transfer. By assuming that, after forming an
alliance, the firms become competitors of equal size in the entrepreneurial firm’s market
and that the firms cannot negotiate directly on profits or entry but can only transfer equity
while forming an alliance, the author argues that equity can eliminate the established
firm’s entry incentive. When the established firm has a larger stake in the entrepreneurial
firm’s monopoly profits, the established firm’s entrance into the entrepreneurial firm’s
market becomes less attractive. When the entrepreneurial firm sells a large enough equity
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stake to an established firm, the established firm’s non-entry payoff is always larger than
the entry payoff if the established firm holds an equity interest in the entrepreneurial firm
while also entering the entrepreneurial firm’s market at the same time.
In summary, the main finding in the above-mentioned studies is that equity
investment in an alliance can serve a monitoring purpose, resolve uncertainty before
committing more resources, and eliminate the potential entry incentive of the alliance
partners.
2.3.4 Other Strategic Alliances Studies
Besides the above issues that are widely explored, other topics such as risk (Arend,
2004b; Robinson, 2006), opportunism (Smith, 2005), and marginal value (Wassmer,
2004) associated with strategic alliances are examined in the existing literature.
Chung, Singh, and Lee (2000) use a sample of underwriting syndicates for new
common stock issues by U.S. investment banking firms during the period of 1980-1989
to investigate the formation of strategic alliances. They conclude that the likelihood of an
alliance being formed between investment banks is positively related to the
complementarily of their capabilities and their similarity of status. The authors find an
inverted U-shaped relationship between the probability of forming an alliance with a
potential partner by the leading bank and their business relationship over the past three
years. Investment banks seem to follow a balancing strategy that provides more
opportunities to their past partners until they come to believe they are over-dependence
on their old partners. Then they start exploring potential new partners in the market.
Arend (2004b) uses an event-study methodology to examine how alliance activity
affects firm risk. The implied volatility of a firm’s stock price is used as the risk measure.
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He tests his hypotheses in the U.S.-based computing industry (i.e., SIC codes 737, 357,
367—computer software, hardware, and components, respectively) during the period of
1984 to 1994. The results show that volatility increases when the alliance and each firm
have similar core activities; volatility decreases when the alliance has a governance form
more like a joint venture or when alliance activity functions to set a technical standard.
The author states that how managers engage in alliance activity can have a significant
impact on the risk related to the value of shareholders.
Wassmer (2004) addresses the problem of the marginal contribution of each
additional alliance added to an alliance portfolio using abnormal stock market returns as a
measure. The author argues that an important determinant for value creation is the
portfolio size. Portfolio size is defined as the number of alliances and partners in an
alliance portfolio. Other important factors for value creation are whether the partner is a
prior partner or a new partner and the number of alliances the focal firm has with a
particular partner.
Smith (2005) addresses the problem of opportunism in strategic alliances. The
author argues that the contractual board consisting of representatives from each partner
with equal power provides an incorporated control on opportunism. The governance
structure o f alliances improves information flow and coordination of strategic-level
decisions by forcing the alliance agreement to be implemented. Thus, an integrated check
against opportunism by partners is one of the advantages of alliances.
Robinson (2006) investigates 70,000 international strategic alliances from 1985 to
1999 using a self-developed model of internal capital markets and regression analysis. He
finds that alliances typically occur between industries with different risk characteristics.
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If a firm has activities in different industries, then the alliances tend to occur in an
industry that is riskier on average. The author also argues that the alliance activities
cluster in risky, high-growth, high-tech industries and that certain types of contracts
which are more easily enforced between firms than within firms result in successful
alliances.
2.3.5 Summary
The existing empirical literature of strategic alliances provides strong evidence for
supporting the theories that I mention in the previous section and provides more detail
about the increase in strategic alliance activity over the past 20 years. The studies show
that the value o f the firms studied increased when they became involved with strategic
alliances; the studies examine the impact of alliances in relation to other firm activities,
such as mergers and acquisitions and joint ventures; and provide management of the
firms with insights into the differences between types of alliances. Even though much
research has been conducted, there are still important issues to be examined, and it is
important to do so as strategic alliances are becoming more frequently employed as firms
attempt to compete in a more complex and globalized market.

2.4

Strategic Alliance Formation Process

In this section, I will briefly describe how a strategic alliance is formed. First of
all, based on the market environment, the firm identifies its objectives for developing its
business, assesses the resources needed to achieve its objectives, and discovers existing

gaps between its actual capabilities and needed capabilities. In order to compensate for
gaps in capabilities, the firm can either develop these capabilities itself, cooperate with
others, or engage in mergers and acquisitions. The firm also needs to determine why
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forming a strategic alliance is a better choice than the other options (Harbison & Pekar,
1998).
Choosing potential partners is a difficult task. Harrigan (1985) classifies the
choice into two categories based on the firm’s motivation. In order to improve its
competitive position in the industry, the firm looks for partners to enhance its existing
strategic position by eliminating competitors and influencing the evolution of the industry.
In order to achieve planned business development in a market, the firm finds partners that
possess the potential for strengthening its current strategic position by exploring
synergies, transferring expertise, or expanding through diversification. In order to screen
out unsuitable partners, the firm should assess the strengths and weaknesses of each of
the potential partners. If the potential partners have engaged in any strategic alliances
before, a detailed check on these past experiences is a must. The past experiences of
potential partners are references for their performance in future alliances. Even though
the partner firms have complementary motivations when they agree to join the alliance,
they do not have to have the same motivation. Anticipating and thinking from each
partner’s point of view helps the firm to avoid conflicts later on.
The firm then needs to assess the value creation of the alliance and to decide what
to offer and gain. The firm recognizes any potential difficulties, determines how the
ownership o f the alliance is divided between or among the partners, projects what the
potential capability difference is after the alliance, and identifies what potential product
advantage could be delivered after the alliance from the customers’ points of view
(Harbison & Pekar, 1998).
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The firm needs to assess the impact of the alliance on stakeholders, including
investors, workers, suppliers, customers, regulatory officials, etc, and to establish a
system that forces the managers who are in charge of the alliance to consider the interests
of all the stakeholders (Harbison & Pekar, 1998).
In order to negotiate effectively, the firm needs to assess its bargaining power by
answering the following questions: What are the key capabilities and resources the firm
brings into the alliance? Why and how does the firm need to protect its know-how? What
are the resources the partner firms bring into the alliance and what are they seeking from
the alliance? If the partner firms have past alliance experiences, the firm needs to study
how the partners negotiated the alliance agreements before (Harbison & Pekar, 1998).
When negotiating the alliance, it is important to quantify the level of opportunity
brought in or afforded by the alliance. This enhanced opportunity may help to smooth the
obstacles during the negotiations and keep the negotiations moving forward. On the other
hand, it also prevents wasting time on negotiations if the opportunity is too limited
(Harbison & Pekar, 1998).
Before implementing the alliance, a detailed plan of integration of the partner
firms needs to be discussed. The plan should include assigning high-ability managers to
the alliance, making clear the responsibilities and authorities of the managers, structuring
the alliance to meet the objectives of the alliance instead of those of the individual partner
firms, establishing a periodic review process, setting up the procedures to deal with the
termination of the alliance, and determining the penalty and exit obligations (Harbison &
Pekar, 1998).
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When implementing the alliance, the partner firms need to set up timetables and
measurement tools to track the progress of the alliance and, at the same time, keep an eye
on competitors. If problems arise during the life of the alliance, the partner firms need to
have open communication channels in order to avoid alliance failure (Harbison & Pekar,
1998).
In summary, the formation process of a strategic alliance starts by identifying the
objectives and potential partners, identifying pros and cons, negotiating with potential
partners on the agreement, and ends up with implementing the agreement. In order to
create a successful alliance and achieve prospective objectives, some key factors need to
be considered when forming an alliance. If the partner firms are former competitors, how
does the alliance alter their competitive positions? If there is a cross-industry skill being
transferred in the alliance, how do partner firms protect their know-how? After forming
the alliance, what are the effects on stakeholders and on the value of the firms, what are
the obligations and rights of the partner firms, what is the degree of control each firm has
over alliance activities, and, furthermore, what are the legal liabilities? Answering such
questions as the preceding is necessary when forming an alliance (Harbison & Pekar,
1998).

2.5 Failures of Strategic Alliances
From either a theoretical or empirical perspective, strategic alliances can be
beneficial for partner firms. H owever, w hen two or more firms engage and cooperate in

one activity, it is not surprising that problems occur before accomplishing common goals
stated in the agreement. Any kind of problem that arises during a strategic alliance might
cause the failure o f the alliance. According to an executive survey, about 30% of
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alliances were considered complete failures; 39% were clear successes (Kalmbach &
Roussel, 1999). These results illustrate that strategic alliances break down easily during
the alliance process. The drawbacks that might cause the failures of strategic alliances are
summarized as follows.
The first major issue that might cause alliance failure is cultural differences. The
number of alliances between partners from different countries is increasing (Harrigan,
1987; Harrigan, 1988). After the formation of an alliance, everything else seems to be all
right; however, the culture clashes make the alliance relationship difficult (Fedor &
Werther, 1996; Vyas, Shelbum, & Rogers, 1995). Cultural differences refer not only to
cultural issues of different countries, but also to different corporate cultures. Different
corporate cultures between firms of the same nationality also cause failures of strategic
alliances (Vyas, Shelbum, & Rogers, 1995).
The second major drawback in regard to alliance failure is the difference in gains.
In alliances, partners not only share the efforts and resources, but also share the rewards.
When the rewards are not shared equally, those firms that get less are more likely to
withdraw from the alliances (Harrigan, 1988; Slowinski, Seelig, & Hull, 1996).
The third major drawback of strategic alliances is related to a difference in
control. Sometimes the implementation of the strategic activities occurs outside of the
control of one or more partner firms and makes them feel uneasy about being in the
alliance.
Other drawbacks of strategic alliances include losing proprietary know-how,
depending on partners for skills (Lei & Slocum, 1991), great liquidation costs of the
alliances when partner firms separate (Day, 1995), and allying with competing firms that
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hamper the existing alliance (Singh & Mitchell, 1996).

2.6 Summary
As a result of the intensive review of past and current literature, I have gained
knowledge of what has been done and what I may do in terms of enhancing the
understanding of alliances. Definitions for “strategic alliances” provided in the existing
literature help me to define “strategic alliances” for purposes of this study, which
contains five essentials that appear in earlier studies and which lessens the confusion as to
what an alliance is. The review of theoretical studies also provides me with a better
understanding regarding the motivations for alliance activities. It also helps me to
establish a framework upon which to conduct my own empirical research. The review of
empirical studies helps me to seek research areas that I can further explore in order to
contribute to the existing literature, such as the value of strategic alliances in the financial
services industry, the issue of equity alliances, and the relationship between alliances and
mergers and acquisitions. The literature review also provides reference for sample
collection procedures and methodologies for use in this study. Furthermore, the alliance
formation process and reasons for alliance failures help me to view the entire realm of
alliance activities, which might induce future research on testing the choice of partners in
the formation of alliances as well as the probabilities of failure.
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, I present my research design for this dissertation. The first part of
this chapter presents the hypotheses for this study based on the theoretical and empirical
literature review. The second part of this chapter provides the data sources, the procedure
to obtain the sample, and the detailed sample descriptions. The third part of this chapter
presents the research methodologies employed for hypotheses testing and the variables
used in the study.

3.1 Hypotheses
According to all five theories regarding the motivations for participating in
strategic alliances discussed in Chapter 2, strategic alliances create value for the partner
firms. This suggests a positive overall market reaction to the strategic alliance
announcements by financial services firms. This value creation is supported by the
findings of existing empirical studies (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003; Chiou &
White, 2005).
A ccording to business strategy theory, strategic alliances are often used as a

strategic means to expand the scale and/or scope of firm operations. When the partner
firms seek new expertise, new resources, or new product markets, they may engage in
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cross-industry alliances. When the partner firms seek new geographic markets, expanding
existing product lines, or raising industry barriers against potential entry by new
competitors, they may participate in within-industry alliances. The partner firms typically
pool complementary skills, techniques and other resources to increase their market power
in their industry (Chan, Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997). Even though strategic
alliances can create value regardless of whether the alliances are cross-industry or withinindustry, prior studies such as Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) show that
integrating (within-industry) alliances or joint ventures create more value than
diversifying (cross-industry) alliances or joint ventures by financial services firms. Thus,
I expect that the market reaction is more favorable for financial services partner firms that
participate in within-industry alliances than cross-industry alliances.
In order to retain competitive positions in a market experiencing rapid
technological advance, such as the dynamic evolution in telecommunications, firms often
seek global growth opportunities. Business strategy theory argues that when firms lack
financial capital, experience, or expertise to go abroad through internal expansion,
strategic alliances provide a means to overcome these problems. Alliances are also useful
when certain foreign governments prohibit international mergers. Furthermore, besides
corporate culture differences, country culture differences also occur in international
alliances between partners; therefore, greater information asymmetry reduction is
achieved between international alliance partners than between domestic alliance partners.
In the meantime, financial risk such as currency and exchange rate risk is also reduced
through international alliances. Thus, I expect that the market reaction is more favorable
for financial services partner firms which participate in international alliances than
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domestic alliances and that the market reaction is more favorable for financial services
partner firms which participate in alliances with cross-border activities than alliances
involving within-border activities. Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) find that
international alliances and joint ventures entered into by financial services firms create
more value than domestic alliances.
Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999) suggest that equity investment signals a greater
level of commitment and an additional level of confidence in an alliance. The partner
firms work more closely, participate more actively in their alliances, take more advantage
of alliance activities, and further reduce the risk of alliance failures. Allen and Phillips
(2000) demonstrate that abnormal returns are largest when an alliance announcement is
combined with one partner taking an equity stake in the other. Thus, I expect that market
reaction is more favorable for financial services partner firms that participate in equity
alliances versus firms that participate in non-equity alliances.
When partner firms have been involved in related activities before the current
alliance, their prior experience with each other creates a social network and provides
important information about the reliability and capability of their partners (Gulati, 1995).
Such prior learning establishes a better foundation for the new alliance and reduces the
risk of alliance failure. Thus, I expect that the market reaction is more favorable for
financial services partner firms that have prior relationships than firms that have no prior
relationships.
As a result of deregulation in the financial services industry, financial services
firms are now allowed to participate in all kinds of financial services activities such as
banking services, insurance services, and investment services activities. Real options
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theory suggests that the flexibility associated with strategic alliances benefits the partner
firms by allowing firms to try out different strategies when developing new plans.
Business strategy theory also suggests that strategic alliances are often used as a means to
expand the scope of operations. Thus, I expect a stronger market reaction when partner
firms participate in financial services activities other than their own activities, in which
they could not become involved before deregulation.
If the market reaction does not capture all the wealth effects of the alliance
announcements and if the market underreacts or overreacts to the announcements of
strategic alliances, I expect abnormal long-run stock performance after the alliance
announcements. This anticipated result is supported by the findings of Gleason, Mathur,
and Wiggins (2003). They find significant positive long-run abnormal holding period
returns for 6-, 12-, and 18-month holding periods after the alliance and joint venture
announcements.
When forming a strategic alliance, firms evaluate each potential alliance partner’s
strengths and weaknesses before choosing a final alliance partner. It would be reasonable
to expect potential alliance partners check perspective partners’ past strategic alliance
experience in the market (Harbison & Pekar, 1998). According to signaling theory, firms
provide signals as to the quality of their resources when participating in alliances, as
keeping alliances with low-quality resources would be costly. Therefore, the partner firm
chosen should outperform other firms in the same industry when meeting complementary
motivations in an alliance. I expect that the financial services partner firms experience
better operating performance than industry peers before strategic alliances. Chan,
Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) show that strategic alliance firms tend to exhibit
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better operating performance than same industry firms two years before strategic
alliances.
Based on resource dependence theory, partner firms exchange and gain
knowledge and ability through the alliance process, lower their costs, achieve economies
of scale in production, and use the resources pooled more efficiently (Lorange & Roos,
1992). Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) find that strategic alliance firms
experience better operating performances than industry peers two years after entering
alliances. Thus, I expect that financial services partner firms experience improvements in
operating performance and outperform their industry peers after entering alliances.
According to the theoretical literature, strategic alliances reduce information
asymmetries between the partner firms. By pooling resources together, partners of
alliances get the chance to obtain knowledge about each other before becoming more
involved or getting into negotiations for final transfer of resources. Mody (1993) states
that alliances represent experimental organizational forms that can evolve over time and
give rise to joint ventures or mergers. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) and Hurry (1993)
also argue that collaboration such as strategic alliances open the way for a potential
merger or lead to an acquisition of partners. Thus, I expect that financial services partner
firms are more likely to form joint ventures or enter into mergers and acquisitions with
partners than other firms. If the market can predict which firms have the potential to
extend their cooperation through joint ventures or mergers and the market expects that
such cooperation will be beneficial, the market reaction should be more favorable for
financial services partner firms that form joint ventures or merge with partners following
an alliance.
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3.2 Sample
In the literature, the sample sizes of the alliance studies vary widely, from only 96
alliances (Arend, 2004b) to 1,037 alliances (Haeussler, 2004). Some studies include joint
ventures (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003), while others do not (Das, Sen, &
Sengupta, 1998). Most o f the studies use U.S. data, while some investigate alliances in
other countries such as Germany (Haeussler, 2004) and Japan (Chiou & White, 2005).
The industries examined in these studies, again, vary from paper to paper. Most of the
studies include a wide range of industries, while others focus on one industry, such as
Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) and Chiou and White (2005) who examine
alliances in the financial services industry and Arend (2004b) who examines alliances in
the computer industry. Time periods covered by the studies start from as early as the mid1970s to late 2002, with the sample period as short as two years (Hagedoom & Duysters,
2002) to as long as 25 years (Filson & Morales, 2006).
For this study, I obtain the sample of strategic alliances of financial services firms
from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database covering the period 1986 through
2003. The SDC database starts providing comprehensive data on alliances in 1984;
however, I find no strategic alliances that satisfy my sample selection criteria prior to
1986. I examine long-run abnormal stock performance and operating performance of the
sample firms three years after strategic alliance announcements and also examine the
level of cooperation between partner firms after the alliances; therefore, the sample
period ends in 2003, which leaves me three years of data to conduct those analyses. The
18-year sample period covers an entire business cycle and the deregulation process in the
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financial services industry, which allows me to examine strategic alliances in this
industry more thoroughly.
The initial sample includes strategic alliances with at least one firm involved in
banking, insurance, or investment services. I use Kenneth French’s 49 industry portfolios
to identify banking, insurance, and investment services firms: banking includes Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6000 through 6199, insurance services firms include
SIC codes 6300 through 6411, and investment services firms include SIC codes 6200
through 6299 and 6700 through 6799.11 obtain SIC codes from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) at the beginning of the alliance announcement months. When
SIC codes in CRSP are not available for certain firms, I obtain them from Standard and
Poor’s Compustat. Then I restrict my sample to strategic alliances with at least one
financial services partner firm included in CRSP at the time of the alliance announcement.
The same restriction is imposed by Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003), who also
examine the stock market reaction to the strategic alliance and joint venture
announcements in the financial services industry. My sample is further restricted to
alliances that are completed and signed, while those with pending or letters of intent are
excluded. The final sample consists of 795 strategic alliances. Only financial services
firms in these alliances are considered as sample firms, not their non-financial partners;
thus the final sample includes 861 financial services firms. As some of the alliances
involve more than one financial services firm with financial data available, the number of
firms in the sample is larger than the number of alliances.

1 T his classification is available on K enneth F rench’s w ebsite:
http://inba.tnck.dartinouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/D ata_Library/det_49_ind_port.htm l
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In order to fulfill the purpose and objectives of this empirical study, I use different
data sources including SDC, CRSP, Compustat, and Lexis/Nexis. From the Joint
Ventures/Alliances section o f the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database, I obtain the
following variables describing the sample strategic alliances: the deal number of an
alliance, the date when an alliance is announced, the 6-digit partial cusips of an alliance’s
participants, the names of an alliance’s participants, the main activities of an alliance, the
number of participants in an alliance, the status of an alliance (e.g., completed/signed,
pending, letter o f intent, terminated, etc.), whether the participants of an alliance are from
different countries, whether the activities of an alliance occur in different countries,
whether an alliance has a specified time the alliance is intended to last in the alliance
agreement, and detailed text description of the alliance.
The announcement date of an alliance is a key variable for this study, especially
when examining the market reaction to the alliance announcement. Therefore, after
obtaining the announcement date of an alliance from the SDC database, I check
Lexis/Nexis for further confirmation. Lexis/Nexis offers fixll-text online news, business,
legal, legislative, and regulatory information. For each of the 795 alliances in the sample,
I search business and finance news and news wires sections using the names of an
alliance’s participants. Most of the announcement dates found in Lexis/Nexis are
consistent with the announcement dates reported in the SDC database, while some are
days later. For the final announcement dates in the sample, I use the dates reported in the
SDC database, which seems to provide earlier announcement dates. Due to the sample
size, it is not possible to ensure that there is no other news relating to sample firms right
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before or at the time of strategic alliance announcements. However, I have no reason to
expect that such news would be biased towards positive or negative news.
From CRSP, I obtain the stock market returns for the market reaction analyses
and the long-run abnormal stock performance analyses. From Kenneth French’s website,
I obtain the data for the 4-factor model analysis. I use both CRSP and Compustat data for
the operating performance analysis and for providing the financial characteristics of the
sample firms.
From the Joint Ventures/Alliances section of the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions
database, I obtain the following variables for examining joint ventures between partner
firms after strategic alliances: the date when a joint venture is announced, the date when a
joint venture is effected, the 6-digit partial cusips of a joint venture’s participants, and the
status of a joint venture (e.g., completed/signed, pending, letter of intent, terminated, etc.).
From the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database, I obtain the following variables for
examining mergers and acquisitions between partner firms after strategic alliances: the
date when a merger and acquisition is announced, the date when a merger and acquisition
is effected, the 6-digit partial cusip of the acquirer firm, the 6-digit partial cusip of the
target firm, and the status of a merger and acquisition (e.g., completed, withdrawn, status
unknown, etc.).
Table 3.1 provides the number and percentage of strategic alliances by year. The
sample covers the 1986 to 2003 period. The distribution shows a similar pattern as shown
in the “Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector” (Group of Ten, 2001). Only
about 1% of sample alliances occur in the 1980s; however, since 1990, the number of
alliances increases dramatically, with the highest number in the late 1990s. Fifty-three
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percent of sample alliances occur during the 4-year period 1997 to 2000. Deregulation in
the financial services industry in 1997 that allowed commercial banks to acquire
investment banks as Section 20 subsidiaries and the Financial Services Modernization
Act passed in 1999 seem to induce strategic alliances in the industry. Sixty-six percent of
sample alliances occur after 1996, and 40.63% occur after 1998.

Table 3.1
Distribution o f strategic alliances by year.
Y ear
N um ber o f
alliances
Percent o f
alliances
Year
N um ber o f
alliances
Percent o f
alliances

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1

3

1

3

7

18

25

40

43

63

0.13

0 .3 8

0.13

0 .3 8

0 .8 8

2 .2 6

3 .1 4

5.03

5.41

7 .92

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Total

63

91

114

128

91

52

29

23

795

7 .9 2

11.45

14.34

16.10

11.45

6 .5 4

3.65

2 .8 9

100.00

T he sam ple includes strategic alliances b y financial services firm s announced during 1986 to 2 0 0 3 reported
in the Securities D ata Corporation (S D C ) database. I lim it the sam ple to alliances in volvin g at least one
firm in the financial services industry (SIC co d es o f 6 0 0 0 through 6 1 9 9 for banking; 6 3 0 0 through 6411 for
insurance services; and 6 2 0 0 through 6 2 9 9 and 6 7 0 0 through 6 7 9 9 for investm ents services). I restrict the
sam ple to financial services firm s included in C R SP at the tim e o f the announcem ent.

Table 3.2 provides the distribution of strategic alliances by the number of alliance
partners. The number of partners varies from 2 to 16; however, more than 89% of sample
alliances involve only two partners, and less than 2% involve more than four partners.
Furthermore, most sample alliances do not have time restrictions concerning the length of
the alliance; almost 95% of alliances are open-length alliances (not reported in the table).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54

Table 3.2
Distribution of strategic alliances by number o f partner firms.
N um ber o f
partners
N um ber o f
alliances
Percent o f
alliances

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

16

T otal

709

54

17

6

3

3

1

1

1

795

8 9 .1 8

6 .7 9

2 .1 4

0 .7 5

0 .3 8

0 .3 8

0 .1 3

0 .1 3

0 .1 3

100.00

T he sam ple in clu d es strategic alliances b y financial services firms announced during 1986 to 2 0 0 3 reported
in the Securities D ata Corporation (S D C ) database. I lim it the sam ple to allian ces in v o lv in g at least one
firm in the financial services industry (SIC co d es o f 6 0 0 0 through 6 1 9 9 for banking; 6 3 0 0 through 6411 for
insurance services; and 6 2 0 0 through 6 2 9 9 and 6 7 0 0 through 6 7 9 9 for investm ents services). I restrict the
sam ple to financial services firm s inclu d ed in C R SP at the tim e o f the announcem ent.

Table 3.3 provides the distribution of strategic alliance firms by industry. Banks
account for about 36.82% o f the sample firms, and commercial banks are the most
common in this industry group. Insurance services firms account for about 15.68% of the
sample firms, and life insurance firms are the most common in this industry group.
Investment services firms account for about 47.50% of the sample firms, and holding
offices which own the securities of banks or other firms and exercise a certain degree of
control over those firms’ activities are the most common in this industry group. Overall,
investment services firms participate in strategic alliances the most, banks second, and
insurance services firms the least.
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Table 3.3
Distribution of strategic alliance firms by industry.

Industry
Banks (6 0 0 0 through 6 1 9 9 )
C om m ercial banks (6 0 2 0 through 6 0 2 9 )
F oreign bank and branches (6 0 8 0 through 6 0 8 2 )

N um ber o f

Percent o f

firms

firms

317

3 6 .8 2

144

16.72

35

4 .0 7

138

16.03

Insurance services (6 3 0 0 through 6 4 1 1 )

135

15.68

L ife insurance (6 3 1 0 through 6 3 1 9 )

42

4 .8 8

Fire, marine, and casualty insurance (6 3 3 0 through 6 3 3 1 )

38

4.41

Others

55

6 .3 9

409

4 7 .5 0

190

2 2 .0 7

93

10.80

Others

Investm ent services (6 2 0 0 through 6 2 9 9 and 6 7 0 0 through 6 7 9 9 )
H olding o ffic e s (6 7 1 0 through 6 7 1 9 )
Security brokers and dealers (6 2 1 1 )
Others
Total

126

14.63

861

100.00

T he sam ple in clu d es 795 strategic allian ces b y financial services firm s announced during 1986 to 2003.
T h ese a llian ces in v o lv e 861 banking, insurance, or in vestm en t services firm s. I obtain SIC co d es from
C R SP at the b egin n in g o f the alliance announcem ent m onth. W hen the SIC cod e in C R SP is not available, I
obtain it from Compustat.

Table 3.4 provides financial characteristics of the sample firms. I obtain the
market value o f equity from CRSP at the beginning of the alliance announcement month.
I obtain accounting variables from Compustat at the end of the fiscal year before the
alliance announcement. I estimate the book-to-market ratio following Fama and French
(1993) and Tobin’s q as the ratio of total assets minus the book value of common equity
plus the market value of common equity to total assets. The sample consists of large
financial services firms with average total assets of $104,332.30 million, ranging widely
from $1,555.38 million in the bottom quartile to $126,933.00 million in the top quartile.
The mean market value of equity of the sample firms is $13,438.85 million, and the mean
book value of common equity is $6,962.05 million. The average sales for these alliance
firms are $11,245.66 million, the mean book-to-market ratio is 0.56, and the mean
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Tobin’s q is 1.48.

Table 3.4
Characteristics of strategic alliance firms.

M ean

B o tto m
quartile

M edian

T op quartile

1 0 4 ,3 3 2 .3 0

1 ,555.38

3 1 ,4 7 1 .5 0

1 2 6 ,9 3 3 .0 0

13,438.85

2 7 6 .2 7

2 ,6 7 9 .3 0

1 4 ,0 3 4 .56

Variable

T otal assets, $M
M arket value o f equity, $M
B o o k value o f co m m o n equity, $M

6 ,9 6 2 .0 5

3 3 2 .2 8

3 ,4 6 6 .5 5

9 ,3 2 4 .0 0

11 ,2 4 5 .6 6

366.91

5,231.81

1 7 ,0 0 8 .0 0

B ook-to-m arket ratio

0 .5 6

0.31

0.45

0.63

T ob in ’s q

1.48

1.04

1.10

1.37

Sales, $M

T he sam ple includes 7 9 5 strategic alliances b y financial services firm s announced during 1986 to 2003.
T h ese alliances in v o lv e 861 banking, insurance, and investm ent services firms. I obtain the market value o f
equity from C R SP at the b egin n in g o f the alliance announcem ent m onth. I obtain accounting variables from
C om pustat at the end o f the fiscal year before the alliance announcem ent. I estim ate the book-to-m arket
ratio fo llo w in g Fam a and French (1 9 9 3 ). I estim ate the T o b in ’s q as the ratio o f total assets m inus the b o o k
value o f com m on equity p lu s the market value o f co m m o n equity to total assets.

3.3 Methodology
In order to test the hypotheses that I present in Section 3 .1 ,1 estimate cumulative
announcement-period abnormal returns, holding-period industry- and size-adjusted
abnormal returns, and calendar-time abnormal returns implied by the 4-factor model.
3.3.1 Market Reaction to Strategic Alliance Announcements
In this study, I use cumulative abnormal returns during the announcement period
to evaluate the market reaction to strategic alliance announcements. Abnormal returns are
estimated as differences between stock returns and returns predicted by the market model.
Stock returns o f the alliance partner firms and returns o f the value-w eighted portfolio o f

all CRSP firms are obtained from CRSP.
In the literature, a great deal of variation is associated with the time period for
estimating the parameters of the market model (estimation period) and the time period for

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57

calculating the abnormal return of the market model (event window). The estimation
period can be as short as 100 days (Gleason, Mathur, & Wiggins, 2003) or as long as 200
days (Chiou & White, 2005). The event window for calculating the abnormal return also
varies widely, from 1 day—the announcement day (Arend, 2004b), to 26 days around the
announcement day (Chan, Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997).
I estimate the market model parameters during the 150-day period ending 30 days
before the announcement date reported in the SDC database. For the whole sample, the
announcement periods to be examined include announcement day 0 (a 1-day event
window), days -1 to +1 relative to the announcement day (a 3-day event window), days
-3 to +3 relative to the announcement day (a 7-day event window), and days -5 to +5
relative to the announcement day (an 11-day event window). These are the commonly
used event windows in the existing literature. A longer event window would only reduce
the power of the test (Brown & Warner, 1985). For the comparison of subsamples, I
focus on 1-day abnormal returns since they have a similar significant value and a lower
standard deviation than 3-day cumulative abnormal returns.
I first examine the entire sample of 861 alliance firms to test the hypothesis that
the market reacts positively to strategic alliance announcements by financial services
firms. In order to test other hypotheses regarding the market reaction to alliance
announcements, I break the sample firms into different groups and examine the
differences in the market reaction to the alliance announcements between these groups.
To classify cross-industry and within-industry alliance partner firms, I obtain the
non-financial services partner firms for each of the alliances in the sample. In this
classification, only the announcements with at least two firms available in CRSP are
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included. If an alliance involves at least one firm from an industry other than the financial
services industry, I categorize the partner firms of the alliance as cross-industry alliance
partners. Otherwise, if an alliance involves firms only from the financial services industry,
the partner firms are classified as within-industry alliance partners. For example, on
March 16, 1999, three firms-Yahoo! Inc. from the computer-integrated systems-design
industry, Bank One Corp. from the financial services industry, and First Data Corp. from
the financial services industry—formed a strategic alliance to provide credit card
processing services for those online stores on Yahoo’s website in the United States. As
this alliance has one firm from other than the financial services industry, the partner firms
are categorized as cross-industry alliance partners. On August 27, 2003, ING Group NV
and Kookmin Bank formed a strategic alliance to engage in bancassurance activities (the
selling of insurance products through banks) in South Korea following the new Korean
bancassurance regulations for the selling of insurance products through banks. As this
alliance has both firms from the financial services industry, the partner firms are
categorized as within-industry alliance partners.
Some multiple-partner alliances have partner firms without SIC codes available in
CRSP; I check further whether the other partner firms with SIC codes available are in the
same industry. If they are in the same industry, I have to exclude these announcements,
since I cannot categorize the partner firms without identifying the industries for all the
partner firms. However, none of the announcements in the sample fit this situation. If the
partner firms for which SIC codes are available are not in the same industry, I can
categorize the partner firms as cross-industry alliance partners.
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I use the variable obtained from the SDC database that indicates whether the
activities o f an alliance occur in different countries in order to make a geographic
classification. If the variable is “Y,” the partner firms of that alliance are classified as
partners of alliances with cross-border activities. If the variable is “N,” the partner firms
of that alliance are classified as partners of alliances with within-border activities. For
example, on November 2, 1999, Citigroup Inc. from the United States and Nikko Beans
Inc. from Japan formed a strategic alliance and agreed to sell each other’s products in
their own countries. As this alliance has activities occurring in two countries—the United
States and Japan—the partner firms are categorized as partners of alliances with crossborder activities. On March 4, 2003, Prudential PLC and UBS AG formed a strategic
alliance and agreed to work together to provide life insurance services in France. As this
alliance has activities occurring only in one country, France, the partner firms are
categorized as partners o f alliances with within-border activities.
I use the nation of the alliance participant obtained from the SDC database to
identify whether the participants of an alliance are from different countries to provide a
further geographic classification. If the partner firms of an alliance are from different
countries, the firms are classified as partners in international alliances. If the partner firms
of an alliance are from the same country, the firms are classified as partners of domestic
alliances. For example, on January 28, 1998, Mellon Bank Corp. from the United States
and Tokyo-Mitsubishi Asset Management, a unit of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi from
Japan, entered a strategic alliance and agreed to work together to offer investment
management services. As this alliance has firms from two countries—the United States
and Japan—the partner firms are categorized as partners in international alliances. On
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August 3, 2002, Community Bancorp of New Jersey and GMAC (General Motor
Acceptance Corp.) Commercial Mortgage Corp. formed a strategic alliance. Under the
alliance agreement, both firms agreed to provide financial services in the United States.
As this alliance has both firms from one country, the United States, the partner firms are
categorized as partners o f domestic alliances.
To classify equity alliance and non-equity alliance partner firms, I obtain equity
investment information of sample alliances from the SDC database. For each of the
alliances in the sample, I read the detailed text information about the announcement. The
text may provide information about which partner firm is the investor, how many shares
of stock are purchased, what is the purchase price, or what percentage of the shares is
purchased. If I am able to find equity investment information about at least one partner
firm buying equity in another partner firm in an alliance, the partner firms of that alliance
are classified as equity alliance partners. If I am not able to find any equity investment
information, I classify the partner firms of the alliance as non-equity alliance partners.
For example, on May 21, 1998, Fleet Financial Group and Parallel Corp. formed a
strategic alliance to combine Fleet Financial Group’s real estate financing methods with
Parallel Corp.’s client base. Under the alliance agreement, Fleet Financial Group acquired
a 20% equity holding in Parallel Corp. As this alliance has one partner firm buying a
minority equity stake (less than 50%) in another partner firm, the firms are categorized as
equity alliance partners.
The partner firms of an alliance might have been involved in any cooperative
relationship before the alliance announcement, which I define as a prior relationship. To
classify the alliance firms by prior relationships, I search for evidence of relationships
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between alliance partners before the alliances in the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions
database as well as Lexis/Nexis for three years before the alliances. If any relationship
can be found between any two partner firms in an alliance before the alliance
announcement, the alliance partner firms are classified as partners in strategic alliances
with prior relationships. If no evidence of a prior relationship can be found in the SDC or
Lexis/Nexis, the partner firms are classified as partners of strategic alliances without a
prior relationship. For example, on November 22, 1999, PNC Bank and LendingTree, Inc.
formed a strategic alliance. Under the alliance agreement, both firms work together to
provide customers more loan options when customers are visiting an online-banking
center-iVillage.com. On March 6, 1998, these two firms had already engaged in another
relationship when PNC Bank joined LendingTree, Inc. along with three other regional
banks—Zions Bancorp, National City Corp., and GreenPoint Financial Corp.—to establish
LendingTree.com and provide a competitive bidding process for mortgages, auto loans,
credit lines, and credit cards. As these two partner firms had cooperated prior to this
alliance, they are categorized as partners in strategic alliances with a prior relationship.
Financial services sample firms participate in a total of 37 different alliance
activities reported in the SDC. I classify the alliance activities into broad activity groups:
financial services activities, marketing services activities, and other activities. The
financial services activities are further broken down into banking services, financial
services, insurance services, and investment services activities. The reason for this
classification is that financial services activities and marketing services activities are the
two most common types of alliance activities for financial services firms. I use the names
of the alliance activities as reported in the SDC except for marketing services activities,
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which include both marketing services and advertising services activities. For each
sample alliance, I use the main activity that is reported first in the database.
The next two classifications are based on the industry and activity classifications.
First, the sample is classified into four groups regarding financial services firms
participating in their own financial services activities in alliances: banks participating in
banking activities, insurance services firms participating in insurance services activities,
investment services firms participating in investment services activities, and firms
participating in other than their industry activities. Second, the sample is classified into
seven groups regarding financial services firms participating in financial services
activities other than their own activities in alliances: banks participating in insurance
services activities, banks participating in investment services activities, insurance
services firms participating in banking activities, insurance services firms participating in
investment activities, investment services firms participating in banking activities,
investment services firms participating in insurance activities, and financial services
firms participating in other than above mentioned activities.
In order to investigate the differences in the market reaction to alliance
announcements between these groups, I use analysis of variance to test for differences in
means and the Kurskal-Wallis test to test for differences in medians.
3.3.2 Long-run Abnormal Stock Performance
I use two methodologies to estimate long-run abnormal stock performance for the
participants o f strategic alliances: holding-period industry- and size-adjusted abnormal
returns and calendar-time abnormal returns implied by the 4-factor model. Even though
holding-period abnormal returns methodology is better for measuring investor experience
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related to the alliance announcements, it assumes cross-sectional independence of returns
possibly leading to inflated ^-statistics (Fama, 1998; Mitchell & Stafford, 2000).
When an alliance firm is delisted from CRSP before the end of the returns
estimation period, the delisting bias would affect firm returns in the analysis. In order to
avoid this delisting bias, I add CRSP delisting return of the alliance firm as the last month
return by following Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999). If the CRSP
delisting return is not available for an alliance firm and the firm is delisted because of
performance reasons, I add -30% as the last month return for NYSE and AMEX firms
and -55% for NASDAQ firms.
I estimate pre- and post-announcement holding-period abnormal returns of the
alliance firms relative to the returns of industry- and size-matched firms. To create the
matched sample, for each alliance firm I find all firms with the same 2-digit SIC code,
and from these firms I choose the one with the market value of equity closest to that of
the alliance firm to the matched sample. I obtain the SIC codes and market values of
equity of alliance firms and matched firms at the beginning of the announcement month.
Strategic alliance firms are excluded from the matched sample for the three years before
and the three years after the announcements.
I calculate the holding-period return for each firm in the strategic alliance sample
and the matched sample using the following formula:

HPR,a,b

fld +^v)

1

• ,

(1)

where H PRia b is holding-period return for the alliance or matched firm i during the
period from a to b; R l t is the monthly return on common shares of the alliance or matched
firm i in month t. The difference between the strategic alliance firm and the matched firm
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holding-period returns is the holding-period abnormal return. When alliance or matched
firm returns are unavailable for the whole post-announcement holding period, I follow
Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002) and use firm returns for the longest period
available. I use a cross-sectional

statistic to evaluate the statistical significance of

holding-period abnormal returns for the strategic alliance firms (Barber & Lyon, 1997).
I reexamine pre- and post-announcement abnormal returns of the alliance firms
using the 4-factor model. I estimate 1-year (2-year, 3-year) pre-announcement calendar
time abnormal returns for the participants of strategic alliances using the following
procedure: Each month, I identify all firms that announced strategic alliances during the
next year (two years, three years) and calculate average monthly returns for these firms
(Rpt). I estimate 1-year (2-year, 3-year) post-announcement calendar-time abnormal

returns for the participants o f strategic alliances using the following procedure: Each
month, I identify all firms that announced strategic alliances during the last year (two
years, three years) and calculate average monthly returns for these firms (Rpt).
The remaining part of the procedure is the same for the pre- and post
announcement returns for the participants of strategic alliances. I estimate the 4-factor
model using three Fama and French (1993) factors and a momentum factor (Carhart,
1997):
R pt ~ Rft ~ a + P m( R mt - R f i) + /3sSMB t + P hHML t + fiJJM D , + s t ,

(2)

where R/t is the risk-free rate for month t, (Rmt -Rft) is the excess return on the market,
SMBt is the difference in returns between portfolios of small and large stocks, HMLt is
the difference in returns between high and low book-to-market stocks, and UMDt is the
difference in returns between portfolios of high and low prior return stocks. Fama and
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French (1993) introduce the estimation procedure for the three factors. Carhart (1997)
introduces the estimation procedure for the momentum factor. I obtain all the data on
these factors from Kenneth French’s website.2 The intercept term a from the 4-factor
model determines the monthly abnormal return for the participants of strategic alliances.
According to Mitchell and Stafford (2000), factor models are not able to explain stock
returns in some cases, and they suggest using an adjusted a I then follow their
methodology and estimate the adjusted a relative to the expected a, which I calculate as
the average a of 1,000 4-factor models of random samples with the same size and bookto-market characteristics as the strategic alliance sample. I also estimate the implied
abnormal returns of the alliance firms for the 1-year to 3-year periods using the formula
(1 + a/100)n- 1, where n is the number o f months in the estimation period.

2 K enneth F rench’s w ebsite: http://m ba.tuck.dartm outh.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.htm l
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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS
In this chapter, I report the empirical results of the analysis. Sections 4.1, 4.2, and
4.3 present the results regarding the wealth effects of strategic alliances by financial
services firms. Sections 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 present the results regarding the level of
cooperation after strategic alliances by financial services firms.
Section 4.1 provides the results for market reaction to strategic alliance
announcements. Section 4.2 presents the results for long-run abnormal stock performance
of the sample alliance firms before and after strategic alliance announcements. Section
4.3 provides the results for operating performance of the sample alliance firms before and
after strategic alliance announcements. Section 4.4 reports the results related to joint
ventures after sample strategic alliances. Section 4.5 reports the results related to mergers
and acquisitions after sample strategic alliances. Section 4.6 provides the results for
market reaction to strategic alliance announcements for alliances followed by joint
ventures or mergers and acquisitions. Finally, Section 4.7 summarizes all the results.

4.1 Market Reaction

Table 4.1 presents announcement-period 1-day Abnormal Returns (ARs) and 3day, 7-day, and 11-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for strategic alliance

66
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financial services firms. Return data for event-study methodology are available for 782
sample firms. The announcement periods include Announcement Day (AD), days -1 to
+1 relative to the Announcement Day (AD-1 to AD+1), days -3 to +3 relative to the
Announcement Day (AD-3 to AD+3), and days -5 to +5 relative to the Announcement
Day (AD-5 to AD+5).

Table 4.1
Market reaction to strategic alliance announcements.

.
. ,
A nnou ncem en t p e n o d

AD
A D -1 to A D + 1
A D -3 to A D + 3
A D -5 to A D + 5

M ean
(/-statistic)
0.40% ***
(2 .8 6 )
0.53% **
(2 .3 6 )
0.08%
(0 .2 8 )
0.39%
(1 .1 8 )

M edian
,
(p-value)
0.12% **
(0 .0 1 5 )
0.10% **
(0 .0 4 0 )
-0.12%
(0 .7 9 9 )
-0.01%
(0 .5 8 1 )

T he table presents announcem ent-period A bnorm al Returns (A R s) for the A n nouncem ent D a y (A D ) and
C um ulative A bnorm al Returns (C A R s) for A D -1 to A D + 1 , A D -3 to A D + 3 , and A D -5 to A D + 5 event
w in d ow s for strategic alliance firm s. Return data for event-study m eth o d o lo g y are available for 7 8 2 sam ple
firm s. The A R s are estim ated using a market m odel. I estim ate market m od el parameters during the 150d ay period ending 3 0 days before the announcem ent date. J-statistics are cross-section al /-statistics. Pvalues are sign ed rank test p -valu es.
* * * ,* * , and * S ign ifican ce at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent lev els, resp ectively (2-tail tests).

For the whole sample, the mean announcement-day AR is 0.40% (significant at
the 1% level), and the median is 0.12% (significant at the 5% level). Similarly, Chan,
Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) report an average of 0.64% AR at the day of the
alliance announcement for a sample of non-equity alliance firms, while Haeussler (2004)
finds an average of 3.8% AR for a sample of German firms. The mean 3-day CAR for my
sample is 0.53% (significant at the 5% level), and the median is 0.10% (significant at the
5% level). Similarly, Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) report 0.66% 3-day CARs for
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a sample o f financial services firms announcing strategic alliances or joint ventures.
Longer announcement periods for my sample result in positive but insignificant CARs.
The market reaction results are also consistent with Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998) and
Chiou and White (2005), who report positive average cumulative abnormal returns
associated with the alliance announcements using different event windows. The findings
support the hypothesis that the market reacts positively to strategic alliance
announcements by financial services firms.
Table 4.2 presents the market reaction to strategic alliance announcements by
alliance classifications. The announcement period is the announcement day reported in
the SDC.
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Table 4.2
Market reaction to strategic alliance announcements by alliance classifications.
M ean
(/-statistic)

B anks (6 0 0 0 through 6 1 9 9 )
Insurance services (6 3 0 0 through 6 4 1 1 )
Investm ent services (6 2 0 0 through 6 2 9 9 and 6 7 0 0
through 6 7 9 9 )

C ross-industry strategic alliances
W ithin-industry strategic alliances
D ifferen ce, /7-value

A llian ces w ith cross-border activities
A llian ces w ith w ithin-border activities
D ifferen ce, /7-value

International strategic alliances
D om estic strategic allian ces
D ifferen ce, /7-value

E quity alliances
N on -eq u ity alliances
D ifferen ce, /7-value

Strategic alliance partners w ith prior relationships
Strategic alliance partners w ithout prior relationships
D ifferen ce, //-v a lu e

0.46% ***
(2 .6 8 )
-0.04%
(-0 .1 6 )
0.50% **
(2 .0 0 )

M edian
(p -valu e)
0.26% ***
(0 .0 0 4 )
-0.10%
(0 .6 4 9 )
0.07%
(0 .1 6 1 )

0.67% *
(1 .7 5 )
0.40%
(1 .0 6 )
0 .2 4 0

0.30% **
(0 .0 1 4 )
0.04%
(0 .5 0 1 )
0 .1 2 5

1.13% ***
(2 .8 0 )
0.35% **
(2 .3 8 )

0.66% ***
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.11% *
(0 .0 6 6 )

0.171

288
117
377

214
88

51
731

0.0 3 7 * *

0 .3 7 3

0.12% *
(0 .0 8 1 )
0.11% *
(0 .0 7 5 )
0 .6 5 7

0.10%
(0 .2 6 )
0.41% ***
(2 .8 5 )
0 .7 0 6

0.17%
(0 .9 0 6 )
0.11% **
(0 .0 1 5 )
0 .8 1 4

0.13%
(0 .1 7 )
0.43% ***
(3 .0 2 )
0 .5 8 4

0.29%
(0 .2 1 1 )
0.11% **
(0 .0 3 0 )
0 .5 3 7

0.21%
(0 .9 2 )
0.49% ***
(2 .7 7 )

N um ber o f
observations

239
543

23
75 9

57
725

The table presents announcement-day Abnormal Returns (ARs) for strategic alliance firms by alliance classifications.
The ARs are estimated using a market model. I estimate market model parameters during the 150-day period ending 30
days before the announcement date. The strategic alliance announcement day is reported in the SDC. Cross-industry
alliances involve at least one firm from other than the financial services industry. W ithin-industry alliances involve
firms only from the financial services industry. Alliances with cross-border activities are alliances where activities
occur in more than one country. Alliances with within-border activities are alliances where activities occur in one
country. International alliances involve firms from different countries. Domestic alliances involve firms from only one
country. Equity alliances are alliances where at least one partner firm buys equity in another partner firm. I search for
evidence o f relationships between partners o f alliances before the alliances in the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions
database as well as Lexis/Nexis. 7-statistics are cross-sectional /-statistics. P-values are signed rank test p-values. I use
analysis o f variance to test for differences in means and the Kurskal-W allis test to test for differences in medians.
***, **, and * Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (2-tail tests).
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From the industry classification, the results show that investment services firms
experience an average announcement-day AR of 0.50% (significant at the 5% level), and
banks experience an average AR of 0.46% (significant at the 1% level) and a median
value of 0.26% (significant at the 1% level). AR for insurance services firms is not
significantly different from zero. Thus, the market reacts positively when banks and
investment services firms participate in alliances, but this is not the case for insurance
services firms. The results are consistent with Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) who
report positive and significant CARs for commercial banks and investment services firms
announcing strategic alliances or joint ventures. However, they also find significant
positive market reactions for insurance services firms.
From the cross-industry/within-industry classification, the results show that cross
industry alliance partners experience an average announcement-day AR of 0.67%
(significant at the 10% level) and a median value of 0.30% (significant at the 5% level);
while within-industry alliance partners experience a mean AR not significantly different
from zero. The results are different from the findings of Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins
(2003) which show that integrating (within-industry) alliances or joint ventures gain more
value than diversifying (cross-industry) alliances or joint ventures for the financial
services partner firms.
From the cross-border/within-border activities classification, the results show that
partners of alliances with cross-border activities experience an average announcementday AR of 1.13% (significant at the 1% level) and a median value of 0.66% (significant
at the 1% level). Partners of alliances with within-border activities experience a lower
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mean AR of 0.35% (significant at the 5% level) and a lower median value of 0.11%
(significant at the 10% level).
From the international/domestic classification, the results show that partners of
international alliances experience an insignificant average announcement-day AR and a
median value of 0.12% (significant at the 10% level). Partners in domestic alliances
experience a mean AR of 0.49% (significant at the 1% level) and a median value of
0.11% (significant at the 10% level). The results are different from the findings of
Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins (2003) which show that international alliances or joint
ventures gain more value than domestic alliances or joint ventures.
From the equity investment classification, the results show that non-equity
alliance partners experience an average announcement-day AR of 0.41% (significant at
the 1% level) and a median value of 0.11% (significant at the 5% level); while equity
alliance partners experience an insignificant mean AR.
From the prior relationship classification, the results show that alliance partners
without prior relationships experience an average announcement-day AR of 0.43%
(significant at the 1% level) and a median value of 0.11% (significant at the 5% level);
while alliance partners with prior relationships experience an insignificant mean AR.
I also examine the difference in announcement-day ARs between cross-industry
alliance partners and within-industry alliance partners, partners of alliances with crossborder activities and partners of alliances with within-border activities, partners of
international alliances and partners of domestic alliances, equity alliance partners and
non-equity alliance partners, as well as alliance partners with prior relationships and
alliance partners without prior relationships. I find no significant differences in the
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market reaction to alliance announcements between these groups except for the
difference in medians between alliances with cross-border activities and within-border
activities. The median market reaction to announcements of alliances with cross-border
activities is 0.66%, while it is 0.11% for alliances with within-border activities; the
difference is significant at the 5% level. Similarly, Chiou and White (2005) find no
significant difference in the abnormal returns between international and domestic
alliances. The results cannot support the hypotheses that the market reaction is more
favorable for financial services partner firms that participate in within-industry alliances
than cross-industry alliances; firms that participate in international alliances than
domestic alliances; firms that participate in equity alliances than non-equity alliances;
and firms that have prior relationships than have no prior relationships. The nonparametric tests support the hypothesis that the market reaction is more favorable for
financial services partner firms that participate in alliances with cross-border activities
than alliances involving within-border activities.
I also find that cross-industry alliances, alliances involving within-border
activities, domestic alliances, non-equity alliances, and alliances among partners without
prior relationships are more common than other types of alliances by financial services
firms.
Table 4.3 reports announcement-day ARs for strategic alliance firms by alliance
activities. I use the names of the activities as reported in the SDC except for marketing
services, which include both marketing services and advertising services. The market
reaction is positive and significant for alliances involved in banking services, financial
services, investment services, and marketing services. The mean AR is 0.68% for
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banking services (significant at the 10% level), 0.74% for financial services (significant
at the 5% level), 1.75% for investment services (significant at the 5% level), 0.55% for
marketing services (significant at the 5% level), and 0.65% for financial services as a
whole (significant at the 1% level). The median AR is 0.30% for banking services
(significant at the 10% level), 0.14% for financial services (significant at the 10% level),
0.48% for investment services (significant at the 5% level), 0.33% for marketing services
(significant at the 5% level), and 0.16% for financial services as a whole (significant at
the 5% level). The mean and median ARs for insurance services and other services are
statistically insignificant and have lower values. The results show that the market reaction
is positive for the financial services partner firms that are involved in financial services
activities such as banking services or investment services in the alliances.
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Table 4.3
Market reaction to strategic alliance announcements by alliance activities.
M ean
(/-statistic)

F inancial services
B anking services
Financial services
Insurance services
Investm ent services
M arketing services
Other services activities
Financial services firm s that participate in their o w n
activities
B anking firm s that participate in banking
activities
Insurance services firm s that participate in
insurance services activities
Investm ent services firm s that participate in
investm ent services activities
Financial services firm s that participate in other than
their industry activities
D ifferen ce b etw een financial services firm s that
participate in their o w n activities and firm s that
participate in other than their industry activities

M edian
(p-value)

0.65% ***
(3 .4 1 )
0.68% *
(1 .8 4 )
0.74% **
(2 .5 3 )
-0.23%
(-0 .7 8 )
1.75% **
(2 .5 8 )
0.55% **
(2 .0 6 )
0.16%
(0 .6 7 )

0.16% **
(0 .0 2 6 )
0.30% *
(0 .0 7 0 )
0.14% *
(0 .0 6 2 )
-0.34%
(0 .1 9 9 )
0.48% **
(0 .0 3 3 )
0.33% **
(0 .0 1 6 )
0.02%
(0 .7 1 7 )

1.02% ***
(2 .9 5 )
1.20% ***
(2 .7 1 )
0.07%
(0 .1 7 )
2.29% **
(2 .0 7 )
0.29% *
(1 .8 8 )

0.32% **
(0 .0 1 5 )
0.41% ***
(0 .0 0 1 )
-0.10%
(0 .8 6 3 )
0.82%
(0 .1 4 8 )
0.09%
(0 .1 0 5 )

0.73% *
(1 .8 7 )

0.23%
(0 .1 0 7 )

N um ber o f
observations

300
70
113
71
46
110
37 2

122
51
45
26
660

T he table presents announcem ent-day A bnorm al Returns (A R s) for strategic alliance firm s b y alliance
activities. The A R s are estim ated u sin g a market m odel. I estim ate market m od el parameters during the
150-day period ending 3 0 days before the announcem ent date. T he strategic alliance announcem ent d ay is
reported in the SD C . I u se the nam es o f alliance activities as reported in the S D C ex cep t for marketing
services, w h ich in clu d es both m arketing services and advertising services. T-statistics are cross-sectional tstatistics. P -valu es are sig n ed rank test p -v a lu es. I u se an alysis o f variance to test for d ifferences in m eans
and the K urskal-W allis test to test for differen ces in m edians.
* * * ,* * , and * S ig n ifica n ce at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent lev els, resp ectively (2-tail tests).
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Table 4.3 (Continued)

F inancial services firms that participate in banking,
insurance, investm ent services activities other than
their o w n activities
B anking firm s that participate in insurance
services activities
B anking firm s that participate in investm ent
services activities
Insurance serv ices firm s that participate in
banking activities
Insurance services firms that participate in
investm ent services activities
Investm ent services firm s that participate in
banking activities
Investm ent services firm s that participate in
insurance services activities
Financial services firms that participate in other than
ab ove m entioned activities
D ifferen ce b etw een financial services firm s that
participate in banking, insurance, investm ent services
activities other than their o w n activities and firm s that
participate in other than ab ove m en tion ed activities

M ean
(/-statistic)

M edian
(p-value)

N um ber o f
observations

-0.20%
(-0 .6 7 )

-0.31%
(0 .2 6 0 )

65

-1.32% **
(-2 .9 8 )
1.09%
(1 .4 3 )

-1.08% ***
(0 .0 0 6 )
0.47%
(0 .2 0 8 )

3.61%
0.90%
(1 .0 1 )
-0.95% *
(-1 .7 7 )
-0.21%
(-0 .4 8 )
0.46% ***
(3 .0 2 )
-0.66%
(1 .2 8 )

3.61%
0.44%
(0 .4 3 8 )
-0.58% *
(0 .0 7 4 )
0.09%
(0 .7 8 7 )
0.13% ***
(0 .0 0 4 )

13
15
1
s
18
13
717

-0.44% *
(0 .0 7 8 )

T he table presents announcem ent-day A bnorm al Returns (A R s) for strategic alliance firm s b y alliance
activities. T he A R s are estim ated u sin g a market m od el. I estim ate market m od el parameters during the
150-day period ending 3 0 days before the announcem ent date. T he strategic alliance announcem ent d ay is
reported in the SD C . I u se the nam es o f alliance activities as reported in the S D C ex cep t for marketing
services, w h ich in clu d es b oth m arketing services and advertising services. /-sta tistic s are cross-sectional tstatistics. / ’-valu es are sign ed rank test p -v a lu e s. I u se analysis o f variance to test for differen ces in m eans
and the K urskal-W allis test to test for differen ces in m edians.
***, **, and * S ign ifican ce at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent lev els, resp ectiv ely (2-tail tests).

When financial services partner firms participate in their own financial activities
in the alliances, the mean AR is 1.02% (significant at the 1% level) and the median is
0.32% (significant at the 5% level). More specifically, when banks participate in banking
activities, the mean AR is 1.20% (significant at the 1% level) and the median is 0.41%
(significant at the 1% level); when investment services firms participate in investment
activities, the mean AR is as high as 2.29%, significant at the 5% level. Furthermore,
there is a statistically significant difference in means between the market reactions to
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financial services firms when participating in their own activities and participating in any
other activities in the alliances; the difference of 0.73% is significant at the 10% level.
The results show that the market reaction is more favorable for financial services partner
firms that are involved in their own financial services activities in the alliances than for
alliance firms that participate in other than their industry activities.
When banks participate in insurance services activities in the alliances, the mean
AR is -1.32% (significant at the 5% level) and the median is -1.08% (significant at the
1% level). When investment services firms participate in banking activities in the
alliances, the mean AR is -0.95% (significant at the 10% level) and the median is -0.58%
(significant at the 10% level). Furthermore, there is a statistically significant difference in
medians between the market reactions to financial services firms when participating in
financial services activities other than their own activities and participating in any other
activities in the alliances; the difference of -0.44% is significant at the 10% level. The
results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the market reaction is more favorable for
financial services partner firms that are involved in financial services activities other than
their own activities in the alliances.
In summary, the market reacts positively to the strategic alliance announcements
by financial services firms. Banks, investment services firms, cross-industry alliance
partners, partners of alliances with cross-border activities, partners of alliances with
within-border activities, partners of domestic alliances, non-equity alliance partners,
alliance partners without prior relationships, alliance partners participating in banking
services activities, alliance partners participating in financial services activities, alliance
partners participating in investment services activities, alliance partners participating in
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marketing services activities, alliance partners participating in their own financial
services activities, banks participating in banking activities, and investment services firms
participating in investment activities gain significant values for alliance announcements.
Even though different types of alliances provide different benefits and are likely
the result o f different motivations, there are no significant differences in the market
reactions across most o f them. The market reacts more favorably when firms form
alliances with cross-border activities and participate in their own financial sector
activities in the alliances, while the market reacts more unfavorably to partner firms
participating in new financial services activities other than their own activities. The
market seems to believe that the financial services firms would benefit from participating
in alliance activities for which they have the expertise and experience. The results of this
study provide financial services firms additional guidance for selecting from among
various types o f alliances when they elect to participate and collaborate with other firms.

4.2

Long-run Abnormal Stock Performance

Table 4.4 presents the stock performance during the three years before strategic
alliance announcements estimated using holding-period industry- and size-adjusted
abnormal returns (Panel A) and calendar-time abnormal returns implied by the 4-factor
model (Panel B). None of the holding-period abnormal returns are statistically significant.
The abnormal returns determined by intercept a and Adj. a in the 4-factor model are also
not statistically significant. Therefore, I find no evidence o f abnormal stock performance

before alliance announcements with either of the methodologies.
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Table 4.4
Stock performance before strategic alliance announcements.
P anel A: H old in g-p eriod abnormal returns
One year
M ean

T w o years
2.87%

2.32%

(/-statistic)

Three years

(0 .7 6 )

-4.97%

(0 .5 9 )

(-0 .8 2 )

P anel B . C alendar-tim e returns
Rpt - R f t = a + P m(Rm, - Rft) + PJ5MBt + PhHML, + P J J M D , + s,

O ne year
Im plied 1-year
AR
T w o years
Im plied 2-year
AR
Three years
Im plied 3 -year
AR

a

Adj. a

Pm

A

Ph

A

(/-statistic)

(/-statistic)

(/-statistic)

(/-statistic)

(/-statistic)

(/-statistic)

1 .3 157***
(2 1 .3 1 )

0 .2 3 1 1 * * *
(3 .0 4 )

0 .6 5 4 7 * * *
(6 .9 5 )

-0 .0 4 5 9
(-0 .8 6 )

1.2204***
(2 2 .7 8 )

0 .2 0 5 6 * * *
(3 .1 2 )

0 .5 6 8 8 * * *
(7 .0 2 )

-0 .0 5 8 0
(-1 .2 6 )

1.1653***
(2 3 .9 7 )

0 .1 5 7 8 * * *
(2 .6 1 )

0 .5 0 0 3 * * *
(6 .8 4 )

-0 .0 9 0 2 * *
(-2 .1 4 )

0 .0 1 9 7
(0 .0 8 )

-0 .0 5 5 0
(-0 .2 1 )

0.24%

-0.66%

0 .1 4 7 3
(0 .6 7 )

0 .0 9 9 2
(0 .4 5 )

3.60%

2.41%

0 .2 4 4 8
(1 .2 4 )

0 .1 5 3 4
(0 .7 8 )

9.20%

5.67%

P anel A reports h olding-period abnormal returns o f the alliance firm s estim ated relative to the returns o f
industry- and size-m atch ed firms. Strategic alliance firm s are exclu d ed from the m atched sam ple for the
three years before to three years after the announcem ent. T-statistics reported in parentheses are crosssectional f-statistics. P anel B reports results from the 4-factor m od el. T o estim ate 1-year (2-year, 3-year)
period abnormal m onthly returns, each m onth I id en tify all firm s that m ade strategic alliances during the
next year (tw o years, three years) and calculate eq u ally w eigh ted average-m onthly returns for these firm s
(R pt). Rft is the risk-free rate, (R mt - R ft) is the e x c e ss return on the market, S M B t is the d ifference in returns
b etw een p ortfolios o f sm all and large stock s, H M L t is the difference in returns b etw een h igh and lo w b ookto-m arket stocks, and U M D t is the d ifference in returns b etw een portfolios o f h igh and lo w prior-retum
stocks. T he m onthly abnorm al return o f the alliance firms is determ ined b y the intercept term a. The
adjusted intercept is estim ated relative to the exp ected intercept obtained from 1,000 calendar-tim e
portfolio regressions o f random portfolios w ith the sam e size and book-to-m arket characteristics as the
strategic alliance firm s. I also estim ate im p lied abnorm al returns o f the alliance firm s for the 1- to 3-year
periods ((1 + a /1 0 0 )n - 1, w here n is the num ber o f m onths in the estim ation p erio d ).
***, **, and * S ign ifican ce at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent lev els, resp ectively (2-tail tests).
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Table 4.5 reports the stock performance during the three years after strategic
alliance announcements estimated using holding-period industry- and size-adjusted
abnormal returns (Panel A) and calendar-time abnormal returns implied by the 4-factor
model (Panel B). During the first year after alliance announcements, alliance firms
outperform industry- and size-matched firms by 4.10%, although the difference is only
significant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with Gleason, Mathur, and Wiggins
(2003) who find that strategic alliance and joint venture firms outperform their industryand size-matching firms after the announcements using 1-year holding-period abnormal
returns. However, there is no evidence of holding-period abnormal returns during later
years in my study. Furthermore, I find no evidence of abnormal stock performance using
the 4-factor model in any o f the time periods after alliance announcements. Thus, I do not
have consistent results when using these two methodologies to support the hypothesis
that the long-run abnormal stock performance is positive after the alliance
announcements.
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Table 4.5
Stock performance after strategic alliance announcements.
P anel A: H old in g-p eriod abnorm al returns
T w o years

O ne year
M ean

4.10%

(/-statistic)

Three years

4.36%

(1 .8 4 )*

4.09%

(1 .4 5 )

(1 .2 5 )

P anel B. C alendar-tim e returns

RPt -R f, = a

+

P J R m, - RfJ + flsSMB, + ppIM L,

One year
Im plied 1-year
AR
T w o years
Im plied 2-year
AR
Three years
Im plied 3 -year
AR

+

pJJMD,

+

s,

a

Adj. a

)3m

J3S

ph

A

(/-statistic)

(/-statistic)

(/-statistic)

(/-statistic)

(/-statistic)

(/-statistic)

-0 .0 4 8 6
(-0 .1 9 )

( 0 .02 )

1 .0 451***
(1 7 .0 3 )

0 .3 3 1 3 * * *
(4 .5 2 )

0 .4 5 9 6 * * *
(5 .0 9 )

-0 .1 7 1 4 * * *
(-3 .3 0 )

1 .0 594***
(1 6 .9 4 )

0 .2 7 3 9 * * *
(3 .6 6 )

0 .5 2 4 0 * * *
(5 .7 0 )

-0 .2 1 9 0 * * *
(-4 .1 0 )

1 .0 748***
(1 7 .7 4 )

0 .2 6 4 0 * * *
(3 .6 4 )

0 .5 5 0 3 * * *
(6 .1 8 )

-0 .2 3 0 6 * * *
(-4 .4 6 )

0 .0 0 5 6

-0.58%

0.07%

0 .0 9 3 6
(0 .3 7 )

0 .1 1 6 4
(0 .4 6 )

2.27%

2.83%

0.1261
(0 .5 2 )

0 .1 5 1 8
(0 .6 2 )

4.64%

5.61%

P anel A reports h olding-period abnormal returns o f the allian ce firm s estim ated relative to the returns o f
industry- and size-m atch ed firm s. Strategic alliance firm s are exclu d ed from the m atched sam ple for the
three years before to three years after the announcem ent. T-statistics reported in parentheses are crosssectional /-statistics. Panel B reports results from the 4-factor m od el. T o estim ate 1-year (2-year, 3-year)
period abnormal m onthly returns, each m onth I id en tify a ll firm s that m ade strategic alliances during the
last one year (tw o years, three years) and calculate eq u ally w eig h ted average-m onthly returns for these
firm s (Rpt). Rft is the risk-free rate, (R mt - R ft) is the e x c ess return o n the market, SM B , is the difference in
returns b etw een portfolios o f sm all and large stocks, HM Lt is the difference in returns b etw een h igh and
lo w book-to-m arket stocks, and U M D , is the difference in returns b etw een p ortfolios o f high and lo w
prior-retum stocks. T he m onthly abnorm al return o f the alliance firm s is determ ined b y the intercept term c l
T he adjusted intercept is estim ated relative to the exp ected intercept obtained from 1,000 calendar-tim e
portfolio regressions o f random portfolios w ith the sam e size and book-to-m arket characteristics as the
strategic alliance firm s. I also estim ate im p lied abnormal returns o f the alliance firm s for the 1- to 3-year
periods ((1 + a /1 0 0 )n- 1, w here n is the num ber o f m onths in the estim ation period).
***, **, and * S ign ifican ce at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent lev els, resp ectively (2-tail tests).
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4.3 Operating Performance
In order to test the hypotheses regarding the operating performance of the
strategic alliance firms, I estimate the raw and adjusted operating performance of the
sample alliance firms during the three years before and the three years after strategic
alliances.
The operating performance measures used are the ratios operating income to
assets and returns on assets of the alliance firms. I estimate the ratio of operating income
to assets o f the alliance firms as operating income before depreciation (Compustat item
13) divided by total assets (item 6). When interest income figures (item 62) are available
for the alliance firms, I add them to operating income before depreciation. Return on
assets of the alliance firms is estimated as net income (item 172) divided by total assets
(item 6). I obtain all Compustat items of the alliance firms at the end of the fiscal year.
To estimate adjusted operating performance of the alliance firms, I adjust
performance measures using industry medians. I first define industries of the sample
firms using 4-digit SIC codes. If fewer than ten firms are found using a 4-digit SIC code,
I then use their 3-digit SIC code. If again fewer than ten firms are found using a 3-digit
SIC code, I then use their 2-digit SIC code. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests evaluate the
statistical significance of the results.
I then estimate the differences in operating performance between three years
before and one year before alliance announcements, one year before and one year after
alliance announcements, and one year before and three years after alliance
announcements. The same procedure is also used for adjusted operating performance.
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Table 4.6 presents the operating performance around the alliance announcements.
The results show that the sample firms improve operating performance before strategic
alliance announcements. From Year -3 to Year -1, the ratio of operating income to assets
goes up by 0.11%, significant at the 5% level, and return on assets increases by 0.05%,
significant at the 10% level. After strategic alliance announcements, firms experience
deterioration in operating performance. From Year -1 to Year 1, the ratio of operating
income to assets deceases by 0.04%, significant at the 5% level, and return on assets
decreases by 0.01%, significant at the 5% level. From Year -1 to Year 3, the ratio of
operating income to assets deceases by 0.06%, significant at the 5% level. However,
changes in adjusted performance measures suggest that this deterioration is driven by
deterioration in industry performance. Around alliance announcements, alliance firms
and same-industry firms have similar ratios of operating income to assets, while the
returns on assets are significantly lower for alliance firms. This finding is different from
Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) who find that strategic alliance firms
outperform their industry peers two years before through two years after alliance
announcements without

significant

improvement or deterioration

in operating

performance for a sample of primarily high-tech firms. My results contradict the
hypothesis that the financial services partner firms experience better operating
performance than industry peers before strategic alliances. The results also contradict the
hypothesis that the financial services partner firms experience improvement in operating
performance and outperform their industry peers after the alliances.
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Table 4.6
Operating performance around strategic alliance announcements.

R aw perform ance m easures, m edians

A djusted perform ance m easures, m edians

F iscal year
relative to the
event year

Operating
in com e /
assets

Return on
assets

Operating
incom e /
assets

-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3

3.03%
3.27%
3.43%
3.28%
3.01%
3.08%
3.04%

1.11%
1.15%
1.16%
1.15%
1.09%
1.15%
1.18%

-0.09%
-0.06%
-0.04%
-0.06%
-0.06%
-0.06%
-0.12%

Y ear -3 to -1
Year -1 to 1
Y ear -1 to 3

0.11% **
-0.04% **
-0.06% **

0.05% *
-0.01% **
0.04%

0.11% **
0.07%
0.13%

Return on
assets
-0.02%
-0.03%
-0.06% ***
-0.08% ***
-0.13% ***
-0.04% **
0.00%
0.00%
0.01%
0.17% ***

T he table reports the raw and adjusted m edian ratios o f operating in com e to assets and returns on assets
before and after strategic alliances. A djusted variables are estim ated relatively to industry m edians. T o
estim ate the statistical sig n ifica n ce o f adjusted m edians and d ifferences in tim e, I u se the W ilco x o n sign edrank test.
***, **, and * S ign ifican ce at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent lev els, resp ectiv ely (2-tail tests).

4.4

Joint Ventures after Strategic Alliances

Mody (1993) states that alliances represent experimental organizational forms and
that they can evolve over time and give rise to joint ventures. However, Chan, Kensinger,
Keown, and Martin (1997) find that only five of their 345 sample alliances are followed
by joint ventures. In order to test the hypothesis that the financial services partner firms
are more likely to form joint ventures with partners than other firms and whether strategic
alliances are used to prepare for joint ventures, I examine the joint ventures between
strategic alliance partner firms after alliance announcements using both the SDC database
and Lexis/Nexis.
As the number of participants in sample alliances ranges from 2 to 16,1 obtain the
non-financial services partner firms for each of the sample alliances and pair the sample
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firms with their partner firms. As the number of participants of joint ventures in the Joint
Ventures/Alliances section of the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database ranges from 2
to 1 7 ,1 pair the joint venture participants and create a joint venture set. Then I search the
pairs of alliance partners in the joint venture set for any joint ventures that have effective
dates that are later than the announcement dates of the sample alliances. If effective dates
are not available for some joint ventures in the joint venture set, the announcement dates
are used instead for the comparison.
Besides the joint ventures found in the SDC, I search the names of those paired
alliance firms in the sections of business and finance, mergers and acquisitions, and all
available wire reports three years after the alliance announcements in Lexis/Nexis. I use
pairs among the alliance firms for searching, because a joint venture might only take
place between two firms instead of all the firms in an alliance.
After searching for joint ventures in both the SDC and Lexis/Nexis, I check for
any repeats for the same pairs of partner firms. I keep only those joint ventures with a
completed/signed status, and the effective dates are the earliest among the repeats.
In Table 4.7, I present the number of strategic alliance firms that expand their
cooperation by setting up joint ventures with their alliance partners. In Panel A, I
examine my full sample of 795 strategic alliances by financial services firms. By
searching the SDC and Lexis/Nexis databases, I find only 14 joint ventures after the
formation of strategic alliances (1.76% of all alliances).
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Table 4.7
Joint ventures after strategic alliances.
P anel A: Full sam ple o f strategic alliances
Strategic
alliance sam ple
N um ber o f strategic allian ces
N um ber o f jo in t ventures
Percentage o f jo in t ventures

R andom
sam ple

795

795

14

0

1.76

0

D ifferen ce

/ ’-value

14
1.76***

0 .0 0 0

P anel B: R estricted sam ple o f strategic alliances
Strategic
alliance sam ple
N um ber o f strategic alliances
N um ber o f jo in t ventures
Percentage o f jo in t ventures

M atched
sam ple

267

267

12

1

4 .4 9

0.3 7

D ifferen ce

P -value

11
412***

0 .0 0 2

In Panel A , I exam ine the sam ple o f 795 strategic allian ces b y financial services firm s announced during
1986 to 2 0 0 3 . 1 search the Joint V en tu res/A llian ces sectio n o f the S D C M ergers and A cq u isition s database
and L ex is/N ex is to find w h ich strategic alliance firm s form ed jo in t ventures w ith alliance partners after the
alliance. For com parison, I create a random sam ple b y replacing each firm in the strategic alliance sam ple
b y a random ly selected C R SP firm included in the database at the tim e o f the alliance. In Panel B , I
exam ine the sam ple restricted to strategic allian ces w ith at least tw o firms in clu d ed in C R SP at the tim e o f
the alliance. For com parison, I create a sam ple m atched b y the 2-d igit SIC co d e and the market value o f
equity at the b egin n in g o f the alliance announcem ent m onth. T o test the differen ces in percentages o f jo in t
ventures b etw een the sam ples, I calculate z-statistics and report the corresponding p -v a lu es.
***, **, and * S ign ifican ce at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent lev els, resp ectively (2-tail tests).

Forming a joint venture is a common event these days in the competitive market
environment. There were about 60,446 joint ventures formed during the 1990s around the
globe (Moskalev & Swensen, 2007). To eliminate the possibility that joint ventures are as
likely among strategic alliance firms as among any other firms, I create a random sample
of firms and search the SDC database for joint ventures among these firms. I use a
random sample instead of a matching sample because the majority of the full sample
firms are not included in CRSP or Compustat and I cannot obtain firm characteristics to
use for matching. The random sample is created by replacing each firm in a strategic
alliance by a randomly selected CRSP firm included in the database at the time of the
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alliance announcement. I require that the same random firm not be included in the same
strategic alliance more than once. The random sample excludes strategic alliance firms in
my sample. I find no evidence of joint ventures for the random sample firms after
strategic alliance dates. To test the statistical significance of difference in the percentages
of joint ventures for alliance and randomly selected firms, I calculate the z-statistic and
report the corresponding p-value. The test shows that the strategic alliance firms are more
likely to create joint ventures than randomly selected firms, significant at the 1% level.
In Panel B of Table 4 .7 ,1 examine the sample restricted to 267 strategic alliances
with at least two firms included in CRSP at the time of the alliance announcement.
Twelve o f these strategic alliances (4.49%) are followed by joint ventures. For
comparison, I create a sample matched by the 2-digit SIC code and the market value of
equity at the beginning o f the alliance announcement month, then search the SDC
database for joint ventures among these matched firms. I find one joint venture created by
the matched firms after strategic alliance dates. To test the statistical significance of
difference in the percentages of joint ventures for alliance and matched firms, I calculate
the z-statistic and report the corresponding p-value. The test shows that the strategic
alliance firms are more likely to create joint ventures than matched firms, significant at
the 1% level.
In summary, the results support the hypothesis that strategic alliance firms are
more likely to form joint ventures with partners than randomly selected or matched firms.
However, joint ventures are not common after strategic alliances; only about 1.76% of
alliances in my sample result in joint ventures. Similarly, Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and
Martin (1997) find only 1.45% of their 345 sample alliances evolve into joint ventures.
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This finding suggests that firms often form alliances without expecting this cooperation
to become more involved through joint ventures. Therefore, instead of a preparation
strategy for forming joint ventures later on, a strategic alliance seems to stand alone as an
organizational strategy itself and provides alliance partners with other motivations.

4.5

Mergers and Acquisitions after Strategic Alliances

Mergers and acquisitions are an important means for firms to expand or explore
growth opportunities. However, because of the information asymmetry between the target
and the acquirer, the bidding price may be incorrect or the targets with bad quality may
be selected. Strategic alliances between the target and the acquirer before the acquisition
can help to reduce this information asymmetry. By pooling resources together and doing
the tryout, the partners of the alliance get the chance to obtain knowledge about each
other before getting into negotiations for the final transfer of resources. It is a trial
marriage and is an important first step before eventually undertaking a merger or
acquisition (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993). Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) and Hurry
(1993) also argue that collaboration such as forming a strategic alliance opens the way for
a potential merger or leads to an acquisition of partners. To test the hypothesis that the
financial services partner firms are more likely to undertake mergers and acquisitions
with partners than other firms and determine whether strategic alliances are used to
prepare for mergers and acquisitions, I examine mergers and acquisitions between the
strategic alliance partner firms follow ing alliance announcements using both the SDC

database and Lexis/Nexis.
As the number of participants in sample alliances ranges from 2 to 16, I first
obtain the non-financial services partner firms for each of the sample alliances and pair
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the sample firms with their partner firms. Then I search these pairs in the SDC Mergers
and Acquisitions section for any deals that have effective dates that are later than the
announcement dates of the sample alliances. If effective dates are not available for some
deals in the SDC, I use the announcement dates instead for the comparison.
Besides the mergers and acquisitions found in the SDC, I search the names of
those paired alliance firms in the sections of business and finance, mergers and
acquisitions, and all available wire reports three years after the alliance announcements in
Lexis/Nexis. I use pairs among the alliance firms for searching, because mergers and
acquisitions might only take place between two firms instead of all the firms in an
alliance.
After searching for mergers and acquisitions in both the SDC and Lexis/Nexis, I
check for any repeats for the same pairs of partner firms. I keep only those mergers with
status as completed, and the effective days are the earliest among the repeats.
In Table 4.8, I present the number of strategic alliance firms that expand their
cooperation by merging with their alliance partners. In Panel A, I examine my full sample
of 795 strategic alliances by financial services firms. By searching the SDC and
Lexis/Nexis, I find only 23 mergers and acquisitions after the formation of strategic
alliances (2.89% of all alliances).3

3 Initially I found 2 8 announcem ents o f m ergers and acquisitions b y strategic alliance firms; h ow ever, tw o
o f them w ere w ithdrawn, another tw o w ere pending, and o n e w as in unknow n status.
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Table 4.8
Mergers and acquisitions after strategic alliances.
Panel A: Full sam ple o f strategic alliances
Strategic
alliance sam ple
N um ber o f strategic alliances

795

N um ber o f m ergers and acquisitions

23

Percentage o f m ergers and acquisitions

2 .8 9

R andom
sam ple

D ifferen ce

P -va lu e

795
0
0

23
2 .8 9 * * *

0 .0 0 0

Panel B: R estricted sam ple o f strategic alliances
Strategic
alliance sam ple
N um ber o f strategic alliances

M atched
sam ple

D ifferen ce

267

267

N um ber o f m ergers and acquisitions

6

0

6

Percentage o f m ergers and acquisitions

2.25

0

2 .2 5 * *

F -valu e

0 .0 1 3

In Panel A , I exam ine the sam ple o f 7 9 5 strategic allian ces b y financial services firms announced during
1986 to 2 0 0 3 . 1 search the S D C M ergers and A cq u isition s database and L ex is/N ex is to find w h ich strategic
alliance firm s m erged w ith alliance partners after the alliance. For com parison, I create a random sam ple b y
replacing each firm in the strategic alliance sam ple b y a random ly selected C R SP firm included in the
database at the tim e o f the alliance. In P anel B , I exam ine the sam ple restricted to strategic alliances w ith at
least tw o firm s included in C R SP at the tim e o f the alliance. For com parison, I create a sam ple m atched b y
the 2-d igit SIC co d e and the m arket value o f equity at the b egin n in g o f the alliance announcem ent m onth.
T o test the differen ces in percentages o f m ergers and acquisitions b etw een the sam ples, I calculate zstatistics and report the corresponding p -v a lu es.
* * * ,* * , and * S ign ifican ce at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent lev els, resp ectiv ely (2-tail tests).

Mergers and acquisitions are frequent events. The “Report on Consolidation in the
Financial Sector” shows that 7,634 mergers and acquisitions occurred in the financial
services industry during the 1990s around the world (Group of Ten, 2001). To eliminate
the possibility that mergers are as likely among strategic alliance firms as among any
other firms, I again create a random sample of firms and search the SDC database for
mergers and acquisitions among these firms. I find no evidence of mergers and
acquisitions for the random sample firms after strategic alliance dates. To test the
statistical significance of difference in the percentages of mergers for alliance and
randomly selected firms, I calculate the z-statistic and report the corresponding p-value.
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The test shows that the strategic alliance firms are more likely to merge than randomly
selected firms, significant at the 1% level.
In Panel B o f Table 4 .8 ,1 examine the sample restricted to 267 strategic alliances
with at least two firms included in CRSP at the time of the alliance announcement. Six of
these strategic alliances (2.25%) are followed by mergers and acquisitions. For
comparison, I again create a sample matched by the 2-digit SIC code and the market
value of equity at the beginning of the alliance announcement month, then search the
SDC database for mergers among these matched firms. I find no evidence of mergers
and acquisitions for matched firms after strategic alliance dates. To test the statistical
significance o f difference in the percentages of mergers for alliance and matched firms, I
calculate the z-statistic and report the corresponding p-value. The test shows that the
strategic alliance firms are more likely to merge than matched firms, significant at the 5%
level.
In summary, the results support the hypothesis that strategic alliance firms are
more likely to merge with partners than randomly selected or matched firms. However,
mergers and acquisitions are not common after strategic alliances; only about 2.89% of
alliances in my sample are followed by mergers and acquisitions. Similarly, Hagedoom
and Sadowski (1999) also find only 2.6% of the strategic technology alliances in their
sample leading towards final mergers and acquisitions. This finding suggests that firms
often form alliances without expecting this cooperation to become more involved through
mergers. Thus, instead of a transition strategy for entering mergers and acquisitions,
strategic alliances seem to stand alone as an organizational strategy itself and are a
reflection of partners’ ulterior motives.
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4.6 Market Reaction to Alliance Announcements for Alliances
followed by Joint Ventures or Mergers and Acquisitions
Table 4.9 presents the announcement-day ARs for strategic alliance firms that
extend their cooperation after strategic alliance announcements. The ARs are estimated
using a market model. I estimate market model parameters during the 150-day period
ending 30 days before the announcement date. Joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions
after the alliances are found from the earlier analysis. If the market can predict which
firms will extend their cooperation and the market expects that such cooperation will be
beneficial, there should be a more favorable market reaction to the alliance
announcements for alliances followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions. I use
analysis of variance to test for differences in means and the Kurskal-Wallis test to test for
differences in medians.
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Table 4.9
Market reaction to strategic alliance announcements for alliances followed by joint
ventures or mergers and acquisitions.

M ean
(/-statistic)
Partners o f strategic allian ces fo llo w e d b y jo in t
ventures b etw een partners
Other strategic alliance partners
D ifferen ce b etw een allian ces fo llo w ed b y jo in t ventures
and other alliances
Partners o f strategic allian ces fo llo w e d b y m ergers and
acquisitions b etw een partners
A cquiring firms
Target firms
D ifferen ce b etw een acquiring firm s and
target firms
Other strategic alliance partners
D ifferen ce b etw een alliances fo llo w e d b y m ergers and
acquisitions and other alliances

1.11%
(1 .3 1 )
0.39% ***
(2 .7 3 )
0.72%
(0 .6 8 )
1.82% *
(1 .9 4 )
-0.18%
(-0 .6 4 )
4.43% **
(2 .3 8 )
-4.61% **
(-2 .7 9 )
0.36% **
(2 .5 3 )
1.46% *
(1 .7 5 )

M edian

(p-value)
0.84%
(0 .1 1 9 )
0.11% **
(0 .0 2 3 )
0.73%
(0 .2 8 7 )
0.17%
(0 .3 2 6 )
-0.27%
(0 .5 8 8 )
2.24% *
(0 .0 6 4 )
-2.51% *
(0 .0 5 5 )
0.11% **
(0 .0 2 1 )
0.06%
(0 .5 0 7 )

N um ber o f
observations

14
76 8

23
13

10

759

T he table presents announcem ent-day A bnorm al Returns (A R s) for strategic alliance firm s. The A R s are
estim ated u sin g a m arket m od el. I estim ate market m o d el parameters during the 150-day period ending 30
days before the announcem ent date. T he strategic allian ce announcem ent day is reported in the SD C . I
search the S D C M ergers and A cq u isition s database and L e x is/N e x is to find w h ich strategic alliance firms
form ed jo in t ventures or m erged w ith alliance partners after the alliance. T-statistics are cross-sectional tstatistics. P -v a lu es are sign ed rank test p -v a lu es. I u se analysis o f variance to test for d ifferences in m eans
and the K urskal-W allis test to test for differen ces in m edians.
***, **, and * S ig n ifica n ce at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent lev els, resp ectively (2-tail tests).

I find no significant differences in the market reactions for firms participating in
alliances followed by joint ventures. It seems that the market is not able to predict joint
ventures or does not believe them to be beneficial to the firms. The results cannot verify
the hypothesis that the market reaction is more favorable for financial services partner
firms that form joint ventures with partners following alliances.
The results are different for mergers and acquisitions. The mean abnormal return
for partners o f alliances followed by mergers and acquisitions is 1.82%, while for others
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it is only 0.36%, the difference is significant at the 10% level. The results support the
hypothesis that the market reaction is more favorable for financial services partner firms
that merge with partners after the alliances. Furthermore, the favorable market reaction is
concentrated among target firms. The target firms have a 4.43% mean abnormal return
and 2.24% median abnormal return, higher than those of the acquirer firms, significant at
the 5% and 10% level, respectively. The results suggest that the market is able to identify
those partner firms o f alliances that are more likely to be followed by mergers and
acquisitions.
In order to find out what types of alliances are more likely to be followed by joint
ventures or mergers and acquisitions, I further examine the percentages of alliances
followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions across different types of alliances.
Table 4.10 reports the distributions of strategic alliances followed by joint ventures or
mergers and acquisitions. When alliances involve banks, insurance services firms, or
investment services firms, the percentages of alliances followed by joint ventures or
mergers and acquisitions are 3.79%, 4.44%, and 5.62%, respectively. I find no significant
differences in the percentages of follow-up joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions
between cross-industry alliances and within-industry alliances, alliances with crossborder activities and alliances with within-border activities, as well as international
alliances and domestic alliances.
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Table 4.10
Distributions of strategic alliances followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions.

N um ber o f
strategic
alliances

N um ber o f
fo llo w in g join t
ventures or
m ergers and
acquisitions

Percentage o f
fo llo w in g joint
ventures or
m erges and
acquisitions

B anks (6 0 0 0 through 6 1 9 9 )

317

12

3 .7 9

Insurance services (6 3 0 0 through 6 4 1 1 )

135

6

4 .4 4

Investm ent services (6 2 0 0 through 6 2 9 9 and 6 7 0 0
through 6 7 9 9 )

409

23

5 .6 2

C ross-industry strategic alliances

219

18

8.22

48

5

10.42

W ithin-industry strategic alliances
D ifferen ce, p -v a lu e
A llia n ces w ith cross-border activities
A llian ces w ith w ithin-border activities

0 .6 4 6
54

2

3 .7 0

741

35

4 .7 2

D ifferen ce, p -\a lu e

0 .7 0 4

International strategic alliances

239

11

4 .6 0

D om estic strategic alliances

5 43

26

4 .7 9

D ifferen ce, /)-valu e
Equity alliances
N on -eq u ity allian ces

0 .9 0 8
25

7

2 8 .0 0

770

30

3 .9 0

D ifferen ce, p -v a lu e
Strategic allian ces w ith prior relationships b etw een
partners
Strategic allian ces w ithout prior relationships b etw een
partners

0 .0 0 7 * * *

51

6

11.76

744

31

4 .1 7

D ifferen ce, p-v alue
T otal

0 .0 9 7*
795

37

4 .6 5

T he sam ple in clu d es 7 9 5 strategic allian ces b y financial services firm s announced during 1986 to 2 0 0 3 . I
search the S D C M ergers and A cq u isition s database and L e x is/N e x is to find w h ich strategic alliance firms
form ed jo in t ventures or m erged w ith alliance partners after the alliance. C ross-industry alliances in v o lv e at
least one firm from other than the financial services industry. W ithin-industry allian ces in v o lv e firms o n ly
from the financial services industry. A llia n ces w ith cross-border activities are alliances where activities
o c cu r in m ore th an o n e cou n try. A llia n c e s w ith w ith in -h o rd er a c tiv itie s are alliances w here activities occur
in one country. International alliances in v o lv e firm s from different countries. D o m estic alliances in volve
firm s from o n ly on e country. Equity alliances are allian ces w here at least on e partner firm b u ys equity in
another partner firm. I search for ev id en ce o f relationships b etw een partners o f allian ces before the
allian ces in the S D C M ergers and A cq u isition s database as w e ll as L ex is/N ex is. T o test the d ifferences in
percentages o f jo in t ventures or m ergers and acquisitions b etw een the subsam ples, I calculate z-statistics
and report the corresponding -values.
* **, **, and * S ign ifican ce at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent lev els, resp ectively (2-tail tests).
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I find that the percentage of equity alliances followed by joint ventures or mergers
and acquisitions is 28%, while for other alliances it is only 3.90%; the difference is
significant at the 1% level. The percentage of alliances with prior relationships between
partners followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions is 11.76%, while for other
alliances it is only 4.17%; the difference is significant at the 10% level. The results show
that equity alliances and alliances with prior relationships between partner firms are more
likely to be followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions.

4.7 Summary
In this chapter, I present the empirical results of the analyses. Using the eventstudy methodology, I find that there is a positive overall market reaction to the strategic
alliance announcements by financial services firms; that the market reaction is more
favorable for financial services partner firms that participate in alliances with crossborder activities than alliances with within-border activities; that the market reaction is
positive for financial services partner firms that are involved in financial services
activities such as banking services or investment services in the alliances; and that the
market reaction is more favorable for financial services partner firms that are involved in
their own financial services activities in the alliances versus alliance firms that participate
in other than their industry activities. The results also show that the market reaction is
less favorable for financial services partner firms that are involved in alliances with
financial services activities other than their own industry activities.

Using two methodologies to estimate the long-run abnormal stock performance
for the participants of strategic alliances, I find that the results support only the
hypothesis that long-run abnormal stock performance is positive after alliance

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96

announcements in the 1-year period, using the holding-period abnormal return
methodology.
By examining the operating performance of the alliance firms, I find that the
financial services partner firms experience worse operating performance than industry
peers before and after strategic alliances. The results also show that the sample firms
improve operating performance before strategic alliance announcements, while the
performance deteriorates afterwards.
The results for joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions after the strategic
alliances provide support for the hypothesis that the financial services partner firms are
more likely to form joint ventures or get into mergers and acquisitions with partners than
other firms. Finally, the results of market reactions to strategic alliance announcements
for alliances followed by joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions support the
hypothesis that the market reaction is more favorable for financial services partner firms
that merge with partners after the alliances.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTERS

CONCLUSIONS
Due to deregulation of the financial services industry, technological advances, and
globalization, the financial market has become more complex and diversified. Over the
past 20 years, strategic alliances have become important means for accelerating growth
for financial services firms. Strategic alliances can be very useful in raising entry barriers
in the financial services industry and effectively reducing potential threats from future
competition. Partner firms are thus able to maintain their competitive positions. Strategic
alliances can be used as a strategic means for integrating or diversifying to expand the
scale and/or scope of operations. The flexibility of the alliance option benefits the partner
firms by allowing quick expansion and separation without their experiencing divesting
problems and allows firms to try out different partners when developing new
technologies or new marketing plans. By allying with others, firms extend their resource
bases instead o f relying solely on others. The partner firms also exchange and gain
knowledge and ability in the process, lower their costs, achieve economies of scale in
production, and use the resources pooled more efficiently. By entering strategic alliances
with other participants in the market, firms provide signals of the quality of their
resources and experience risk reduction and sharing. Furthermore, forming strategic
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alliances between acquirers and targets prior to mergers and acquisitions reduces
information asymmetries through learning and solves adverse selection problems.
Given the increasing importance of strategic alliances in the financial services
industry, but limited prior research, this study provides a more comprehensive and
detailed investigation of the issue. My study contributes to the understanding of the
wealth effects of strategic alliances on financial services firms and the level of
cooperation between partner firms after strategic alliance announcements. By providing
insight into strategic alliances, this study may help managers o f financial services firms to
participate more effectively in alliances, from the initial formation to the final outcome.
The sample period (1986-2003) covers an entire business cycle and the
deregulation process in the financial services industry. Without including a wide range of
industries in the sample, the results directly reflect the value creation by alliances in the
financial services industry. The study contributes to the understanding of the wealth
effects of strategic alliances on financial services firms by providing a comprehensive
analysis of the market reaction to alliance announcements, pre- and post-announcement
abnormal stock performance of the financial services partner firms, and pre- and post
announcement operating performance of the partner firms. Furthermore, the study adds to
the existing literature by examining the level of cooperation between strategic alliance
partner firms after alliance announcements, such as joint ventures or mergers and
acquisitions.
I examine a sample o f financial services firms that were involved in strategic
alliances during 1986 to 2003. I find that strategic alliance announcements have a
positive effect on the wealth creation of financial services firms. The results show that
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announcements of strategic alliances increase the value of partner firms by 0.53%, which
provides support for financial services firms to maintain active participation in strategic
alliances or to enter into strategic alliances in the future. I find no consistent evidence of
abnormal long-term stock performance before or after alliance announcements. Therefore,
the positive wealth effect o f strategic alliances seems to be fully captured by the market
reaction to alliance announcements. Alliance firms improve their operating performance
before alliance announcements. After alliance announcements, operating performance
deteriorates; however, this deterioration is driven by the deterioration in industry
performance.
Some alliance partners extend their cooperation after alliance announcements.
Consistent with the hypothesis that firms use strategic alliances to reduce information
asymmetries between alliance partners before getting involved in more committed
partnerships, I find that strategic alliance firms are more likely to form joint ventures or
merge than randomly selected or matched firms. However, joint ventures and mergers
and acquisitions are not common after strategic alliances are formed; only about 5% of
alliances are followed by joint ventures or mergers of partner firms. This finding suggests
that firms often form alliances without expecting this cooperation to become more
involved through joint ventures or mergers. Reasons other than preparation for joint
ventures or mergers are more common for strategic alliances of financial services firms. I
also find that the market reacts more favorably to alliance announcements by firms that
are subsequently acquired by the alliance partners. The market seems to be able to predict
at the time of the alliance announcement which firms have the potential for extending
their cooperation. The results also show that equity alliances and alliances with prior
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relationships between partners are more likely to be followed by joint ventures or
mergers and acquisitions.
In this study, I provide a comprehensive analysis on evaluating the wealth effects
of strategic alliances for financial services firms and the level of cooperation between
partner firms after strategic alliance announcements. Similar methodologies can be
employed to analyze strategic alliances in other industries, which might provide insights
into alliance activities for other industry participants.
I also find that financial services alliance partners experience an improvement in
operating performance before alliance announcements and a deterioration afterwards. The
deterioration in operating performance after alliance announcements appears to be driven
by deterioration in industry performance. It is possible that the alliance firms anticipate a
downturn in the industry, and use alliances as a defensive strategy. Further research
should be conducted to explore the reasons behind this pattern of improvement and
deterioration in operating performance of strategic alliance firms, such as under
performing firms more actively participating in alliances and engaging in earnings
management before forming alliances in order to attract better potential alliance partners.
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